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THE UNSUNG VIRTUES OF GLOBAL
FORUM SHOPPING
Pamela K. Bookman*
ABSTRACT
Forum shopping gets a bad name. This is even more true in the context of transnational
litigation. The term is associated with unprincipled gamesmanship and undeserved victories.
Courts therefore often seek to thwart the practice. But in recent years, exaggerated perceptions of
the “evils” of forum shopping among courts in different countries have led U.S. courts to impose
high barriers to global forum shopping. These extreme measures prevent global forum shopping
from serving three unappreciated functions: protecting access to justice, promoting private regulatory enforcement, and fostering legal reform.
This Article challenges common perceptions about global forum shopping that have supported recent doctrinal developments. It traces the history of concerns about global forum shopping and distinguishes between domestic and global forum shopping to discern the core objections
to the practice. It then identifies these unappreciated virtues of global forum shopping and suggests balanced ways for courts to protect them.
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INTRODUCTION
In September 2015, Volkswagen announced it had rigged diesel emissions tests to make its “Clean Diesel” cars seem to comply with U.S. environmental regulations while they were being tested.1 In fact, the cars emitted
pollutants up to forty times more than U.S. law permits. After that
announcement, which affected 11 million cars worldwide,2 Volkswagen’s
market value dropped by about $25 billion, or thirty percent.3 Volkswagen
owners, car dealerships, and shareholders around the world started wondering how they could hold Volkswagen accountable.
Outside the United States, affected consumers, car dealerships, and
shareholders are suing Volkswagen.4 Aggregate litigation is pending in countries from Canada,5 to Australia,6 to South Korea.7 In Europe, Volkswagen is
facing litigation in many different countries on civil, criminal, and regulatory
1 Jack Ewing & Jad Mouawad, Directors Say Volkswagen Delayed Informing Them of Trickery, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/24/business/international/directors-say-volkswagen-delayed-informing-them-of-trickery.html.
2 Guilbert Gates et al., Explaining Volkswagen’s Emissions Scandal, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 12,
2016), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/business/international/vw-diesel-emissions-scandal-explained.html?_r=0.
3 Paul R. La Monica, Volkswagen Has Plunged 50%. Will It Ever Recover?, CNN (Sept. 24,
2015), http://money.cnn.com/2015/09/24/investing/volkswagen-vw-emissions-scandalstock/; Geoffrey Smith, Billions Wiped Off Volkswagen Shares by Emissions Cheating Scandal,
FORTUNE (Sept. 21, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/09/21/billions-wiped-off-volkswagen-shares-by-emissions-cheating-scandal/.
4 Pamela Bookman, Volkswagen and the Changing Landscape of Transnational Litigation,
TEMPLE 10-Q (Nov. 12, 2015) http://www2.law.temple.edu/10q/volkswagen-and-thechanging-landscape-of-transnational-litigation/; 5,000 Dutch Volkswagen Owners Sign Up for
‘Dieselgate’ Case, DUTCHNEWS (Jan. 12, 2016), http://www.dutchnews.nl/news/archives/
2016/01/83160-2/; Mike Spector, VW Faces Barrage of Litigation, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 29,
2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/vw-faces-barrage-of-litigation-1443465416; Christopher Tan, VW Singapore Faces First Lawsuit Over Emission Cheating Scandal, STRAITS TIMES
(Mar. 18, 2016), http://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/transport/vw-singapore-facesfirst-lawsuit-over-emission-cheating-scandal (Singapore); Volkswagen Faces Lawsuit in China
over Emissions, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 15, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/volkswagen-faceslawsuit-in-china-over-emissions-1450176206.
5 Class Action Claim Filed over Volkswagen Emissions, CBC NEWS (Sept. 22, 2015), http://
www.cbc.ca/news/canada/saskatchewan/class-action-claim-filed-over-volkswagen-emissions-1.3239330; Volkswagen Canada Recall, LAWYERSANDSETTLEMENTS.COM, https://www
.lawyersandsettlements.com/lawsuit/vw-canada.html#.VnmFvfkrLBQ (last updated Oct. 6,
2015); Volkswagen Faces Canadian Class Action over Fraudulent Defect Devices, BIGCLASSACTION
.COM (Sept. 24, 2015), https://www.bigclassaction.com/lawsuit/volkswagen-faces-canadianclass-action-over.php.
6 Rob Taylor, Volkswagen Faces Class-Action Suit in Australia over Emissions Scandal, WALL
ST. J. (Nov. 19, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/volkswagen-faces-class-action-suit-inaustralia-over-emissions-scandal-1447910466.
7 Michael Herh, Suing for Lost Fuel: Korean Consumers Take Volkswagen to Court, BUS.
KOREA (Sept. 30, 2015), http://www.businesskorea.co.kr/english/news/industry/12277suing-lost-fuel-korean-consumers-take-volkswagen-court.
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fronts.8 Litigation funding firms and U.S. law firms are leading many of
these efforts.9 In Germany, Volkswagen faces private securities fraud litigation.10 Consumer suits are in the works.11
Within the United States, groups of Volkswagen owners sued in many
different state and federal courts, seeking the best forum under different
criteria.12 These efforts were examples of domestic forum shopping. Volkswagen shareholders around the world have also sought out the best possible
forum for their securities litigation. Some who bought American Depositary
Receipts (ADRs) on U.S. exchanges have sued in federal district court.13 But
many shareholders have filed suit in Germany, Volkswagen’s home forum.14
It is possible that as the litigation progresses, groups of shareholders may
ultimately seek out a court in the Netherlands to recognize a global settlement. These choices are examples of transnational or global forum
shopping.
From one perspective, these lawsuits represent efforts of scheming,
opportunistic lawyers searching worldwide for the best forum for extorting
the highest possible judgment or settlement out of Volkswagen.15 From
another perspective, however, Volkswagen’s actions harmed parties all over
8 See Michael McAleer, Mayo Motorist Files Lawsuit Against VW over Emissions Scandal,
IRISH TIMES (Nov. 14, 2015), http://www.irishtimes.com/business/manufacturing/mayomotorist-files-lawsuit-against-vw-over-emissions-scandal-1.2429416 (Ireland); Hugo Miller &
Richard Weiss, VW Deals with More European Lawsuits from Emission Cheating, BLOOMBERG
(Oct. 2, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-10-02/vw-deals-with-moreeuropean-legal-action-from-emission-cheating (France, Germany, Italy, Switzerland); VW
Faces Biggest-Ever Lawsuit in Europe, DEUTSCHE WELLE (Jan. 14, 2016), http://www.dw.com/
en/vw-faces-biggest-ever-lawsuit-in-europe/a-18977471 (Netherlands); Harro ten Wolde,
VW Sued by German States of Hesse, Baden-Wuerttemberg over Diesel Scandal, AUTO. NEWS EUROPE
(Sept. 16, 2016), http://europe.autonews.com/article/20160916/ANE/160919898/vwsued-by-german-states-of-hesse-baden-wuerttemberg-over-diesel (Germany).
9 Alison Frankel, U.S. Law Firms Are Betting on Control of VW Litigation Overseas,
REUTERS (Dec. 2, 2015), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2015/12/02/u-s-lawfirms-are-betting-on-control-of-vw-litigation-overseas/. On October 25, 2016, District Judge
Charles Breyer of the Northern District of California approved a $14.7 billion settlement
for United States drivers suing Volkswagen AG. Kartikay Mehrotra & Margaret Cronin
Fisk, VW Judge Approves $14.7 Billion Diesel-Cheating Settlement, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 25, 2016),
https://www.bloomberglaw.com/product/blaw/document/OFM39CSYF01V?emc=BLAW
%3A115366889%3A7&resource_id=afd8899ccef477c518badfdf92b24ef6.
10 See, e.g., Aebra Coe, VW to Face German Investor Actions, Litigation Funder Says, LAW360
(Oct. 2, 2015), http://www.law360.com/articles/710492/vw-to-face-german-investor-ac
tions-litigation-funder-says.
11 Caroline Copley, Volkswagen Faces First German Lawsuit over Rigged Diesel Tests,
REUTERS (Oct. 7, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/volkswagen-emissions-germanylawsuit-idUSL8N1273S220151007; Frankel, supra note 9.
12 See Spector, supra note 4.
13 See Karin Matussek, Volkswagen Seeks Dismissal of U.S. Investor Class-Action Lawsuit,
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 2, 2016), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-08-02/volks
wagen-seeks-dismissal-of-u-s-investor-class-action-lawsuit.
14 Id.
15 See Frankel, supra note 9.
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the world; since many different nations empower private citizens to sue Volkswagen under such circumstances, it is only natural for those parties to hold
Volkswagen accountable anywhere they can. Indeed, one might even view
with sympathy affected parties’ efforts to seek out courts that might consider
experimenting with innovative approaches to affording them relief.
Nevertheless, the practice of global forum shopping is widely reviled.16
It is called “a dirty word,”17 “evil,”18 “deplorable,”19 and something that
“must be deterred.”20 The Supreme Court speaks of the practice with great
disdain, vowing to protect U.S. courts from it.21 One of global forum shopping’s most vocal opponents, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, equates
global forum shopping with fraud and other “out-of-court tactics.”22
This categorical denunciation of global forum shopping has several
flaws. First, the practice of global forum shopping is deplored but poorly
defined. Critics often pin the derogatory term “forum shopping” on forum
choices or litigation that they simply do not like for any number of reasons.
Second, critics rarely offer specific explanations as to why global forum shop16 See, e.g., Debra Lyn Bassett, The Forum Game, 84 N.C. L. REV. 333, 337 (2006) (citing
disparaging statements about domestic forum shopping); Louise Ellen Teitz, Where to Sue:
Finding the Most Effective Forum in the World, in INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION STRATEGIES AND
PRACTICE 49, 49 (Barton Legum ed., 2005) (labeling “forum shopping” the “longest fourletter word in international litigation”); Christopher A. Whytock, The Evolving Forum Shopping System, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 481, 531, 531 n.220 (2011) (collecting scholarship concerned about transnational forum shopping in U.S. courts).
17 See Franco Ferrari, Forum Shopping: A Plea for a Broad and Value-Neutral Definition,
N.Y.U. LECTURES, Aug. 2014, at 1 (quoting Atlantic Star v. Bona Spes, [1974] AC 436, 471
(Eng.) (opinion of Lord Simon)).
18 Id. (first quoting Charles Evan Stewart, The Government Suspension Provision of the
Clayton Act’s Statute of Limitations: For Whom Does It Toll?, 60 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 70, 70 n.1
(1985); then quoting Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514, 521 (1953) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting)).
19 Id. (citing Sharad K. Bijanki, Redefining Attorney-Fee Shifting Under the Lanham Act:
Protecting Small Businesses and Deterring Trademark Infringement, 98 IOWA L. REV. 809, 822, 831
(2013)).
20 Id. at 2 (citing Ralph U. Whitten, Improving the “Better Law” System: Some Impudent
Suggestions for Reordering and Reformulating Leflar’s Choice-Influencing Considerations, 52 ARK. L.
REV. 177, 226 (1999)); see also id. (collecting statements of detractors). See generally LYNN
M. LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE: HOW COMPETITION FOR BIG CASES IS CORRUPTING THE
BANKRUPTCY COURTS (2005).
21 See infra notes 146–49 and accompanying discussion.
22 JONATHAN DRIMMER, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, THINK GLOBALLY, SUE
LOCALLY: OUT-OF-COURT TACTICS EMPLOYED BY PLAINTIFFS, THEIR LAWYERS, AND THEIR ADVOCATES IN TRANSNATIONAL TORT CASES 4 (2010). “Plaintiffs’ attorneys have employed audacious and wide-scale legal and extra-legal tactics, from outright forum shopping to
manufacturing evidence to creating favorable foreign laws to extensive use of the media to
locate plaintiffs, pressure corporate defendants, and obtain favorable judgments.” Id. at
33; see also, e.g., Perlette Michèle Jura et al., Disparate Treatment of the Corporate Citizen: Stark
Differences Across Borders in Transnational Lawsuits, 15 BUS. L. INT’L 85 (2014) (disparaging
forum shopping).
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ping should be so widely condemned. And third, critics ignore the possibility
that global forum shopping has any redeeming virtues whatsoever.
This Article responds to each of these flaws. It highlights three unappreciated virtues of global forum shopping: forum shopping’s importance in
protecting access to justice, promoting regulatory enforcement, and propelling substantive and procedural reform. First, concerning access to justice,
Justice Jackson pointed out in the domestic context that having multiple
choices for filing suit can ensure that there is at least one available forum to
vindicate one’s rights.23 This can be all the more true transnationally.24 Second, with respect to regulatory enforcement, limiting forum choice can
impede courts’ ability to enforce substantive laws through litigation. As the
Volkswagen example shows, courts around the world are increasingly called
upon to serve this function.25
Third, global forum shopping can facilitate legal reform. A classic example appeared in 1980, when a group of public interest lawyers persuaded the
Second Circuit to read a long-neglected federal statute to recognize jurisdiction over international human rights claims.26 Ever since, courts have experimented with the scope of that jurisdiction, going from a broad concept
resembling universal jurisdiction, to a limited jurisdiction over only cases that
“touch and concern” the United States.27 Regardless of those debates, however, that 1980 Second Circuit decision led not only to numerous cases
brought under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) concerning human rights violations, but also to global human rights initiatives,28 the enactment of the Torture Victim Protection Act,29 and a deeply held conviction that U.S. courts
should provide a forum for such cases.30
23 Gulf Oil Corp v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507 (1947).
24 See infra Section III.A.
25 See supra notes 1–15 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Mary Garvey Algero, In
Defense of Forum Shopping: A Realistic Look at Selecting a Venue, 78 NEB. L. REV. 79 (1999); John
C. Coffee, Jr., Litigation Governance: Taking Accountability Seriously, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 288
(2010); S.I. Strong, Regulatory Litigation in the European Union: Does the U.S. Class Action Have
a New Analogue?, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 899 (2012).
26 See Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980); infra notes 286–94 and
accompanying text. But see, e.g., Donald J. Kochan, No Longer Little Known But Now a Door
Ajar: An Overview of the Evolving and Dangerous Role of the Alien Tort Statute in Human Rights
and International Law Jurisprudence, 8 CHAP. L. REV. 100, 104 (2005) (citing Human Rights in
Court, WASH. POST, Apr. 6, 2004, at A20).
27 See, e.g., Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013); Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004); Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 69 F. Supp. 3d 75
(D.D.C. 2014); In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
28 Ingrid Wuerth, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.: The Supreme Court and the Alien
Tort Statute, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 601, 620–21 (2013) (arguing that ATS litigation allows
“human rights activists to achieve in one forum what they could not in another”).
29 See, e.g., Philip Mariani, Assessing the Proper Relationship Between the Alien Tort Statute
and the Torture Victim Protection Act, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1383 (2008).
30 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 1670 (Breyer, J., concurring); Pierre N. Leval, The Long Arm of International Law: Giving Victims of Human Rights
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Transnational forum shopping can play a similar role in courts around
the world. Take, for instance, an Austrian law student’s suit against
Facebook. In 2013, the student filed complaints with an Irish privacy regulator against Facebook Ireland Limited, the company that contracts with all
Facebook users outside of the United States and Canada.31 The student
alleged that Facebook, through its participation in the U.S. government’s
Prism surveillance program, had violated European privacy laws. Unsatisfied
with the slow pace of the Irish response, the student withdrew most of his
complaints and refiled in Austria.32 The student also advertised online that
Facebook users all over the world should assign their claims to him, and
through a claim-assignment procedure already recognized in Austrian
courts,33 he has created the largest putative class action in Europe, financed
in part by crowd-sourced funding.34 This case, which the Austrian Supreme
Court recently referred to the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ),
may make Austria and its courts confront some of the most perplexing procedural issues in transnational litigation, including claim aggregation, litigation
funding, and law’s extraterritorial reach.
In addition to calling attention to these virtues, this Article also seeks to
draw out distinctions between domestic and global forum shopping. Domestically, the scholarly narrative about forum shopping tends to be more
nuanced. There is a recognized tension between provisions that allow or
even encourage forum shopping among state and federal courts, and the
numerous laws and doctrines that try to thwart the practice.35

Abuses Their Day in Court, FOREIGN AFF. (March/April 2013), https://www.foreignaffairs
.com/articles/united-states/2013-02-05/long-arm-international-law.
31 See generally Legal Procedure Against “Facebook Ireland Limited”, EUROPE VERSUS
FACEBOOK, http://europe-v-facebook.org/EN/Complaints/complaints.html (last visited
Oct. 19, 2016) (linking to twenty-two of the complaints against Facebook).
32 Part of the case remained in Ireland. On appeal, the ECJ favored the Austrian student’s argument on the merits, upending fifteen years of transatlantic privacy control
regimes. See James Cook & Rob Price, Europe’s Highest Court Just Rejected the ‘Safe Harbor’
Agreement Used by American Tech Companies, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 6, 2015), http://www.businessinsider.com/european-court-of-justice-safe-harbor-ruling-2015-10; see also Derek Scally,
Austrian Court Dismisses Schrems’ Facebook Privacy Case, IRISH TIMES (July 1, 2015), http://
www.irishtimes.com/business/technology/austrian-court-dismisses-schrems-facebook-privacy-case-1.2269365.
33 See Christian Klausegger, Austria, in WORLD CLASS ACTIONS: A GUIDE TO GROUP AND
REPRESENTATIVE ACTIONS AROUND THE GLOBE 252 (Paul G. Karlsgodt ed., 2012) (describing
conventional uses of this procedure).
34 See generally FACEBOOK CLASS ACTION, https://www.fbclaim.com (last visited Oct. 19,
2016). To donate, see Joining Forces for Online Privacy!, EUROPE VERSUS FACEBOOK, https://
www.crowd4privacy.org/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2016).
35 See Aaron D. Simowitz, A U.S. Perspective on Forum Shopping, Ethical Obligations, and
International Commercial Arbitration, in FORUM SHOPPING IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION CONTEXT 23, 27–37 (Franco Ferrari ed., 2013).
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At a transnational level, domestic, foreign, and international law provide
abundant opportunities for forum choice.36 The U.S. Constitution recognizes the possibility of transnational forum shopping.37 But the practice is
nevertheless widely condemned. When courts believe that foreign plaintiffs
are “guilty” of forum shopping,38 they dismiss their cases and adopt doctrines
to combat the practice.39 In recent years, U.S. courts have been particularly
active in erecting barricades against global forum shopping.40 Through
developments in a number of seemingly disparate doctrines, U.S. courts have
sought to protect themselves from a perceived flood of litigation, especially
transnational litigation.41
I have shown in earlier work that closing off U.S. courts to transnational
litigation has unintended negative consequences for some of the U.S.focused interests that these recent developments are supposed to promote.42
36 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012); CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 14 (Fr.);
Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984); Kevin M. Clermont, Litigation Realities Redux, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1919, 1921 (2009) (observing that there is always a
forum choice); Ferrari, supra note 17, at 12–14; Simowitz, supra note 35, at 51 (“[T]he U.S.
system is replete with mechanisms of forum access and forum selection that are fundamental, inextricable, and perhaps ineradicable.”).
37 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (extending the federal judicial power to cases “arising
under . . . Treaties,” “affecting Ambassadors,” in “admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction,” and
“between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects”); see also
Diane P. Wood, The Changing Face of Diversity Jurisdiction, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 593, 593 (2009)
(discussing the framers’ decision to provide for diversity jurisdiction).
38 Simcox v. McDermott Int’l, Inc., 152 F.R.D. 689, 699–700 (S.D. Tex. 1994).
39 See, e.g., Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 270 (2010) (countenancing the purported “fear that [the United States] has become the Shangri-La of class-action
litigation for lawyers representing those allegedly cheated in foreign securities markets”);
Carijano v. Occidental Petrol. Corp., 643 F.3d 1216, 1224 (9th Cir. 2011) (explaining the
purpose of forum non conveniens is to “root out cases in which the ‘open door’ of broad
jurisdiction and venue laws ‘may admit those who seek not simply justice but perhaps justice blended with some harassment,’ and particularly cases in which a plaintiff resorts ‘to a
strategy of forcing the trial at a most inconvenient place for an adversary’” (quoting Gulf
Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507 (1947))); Iragorri v. United Techs. Corp., 274 F.3d
65, 75 (2d Cir. 2001) (en banc) (condemning “choos[ing] a forum for forum-shopping
reasons”); see also Whytock, supra note 16 (discussing the history of responses to domestic
forum shopping).
40 The rhetoric against transnational forum shopping has escalated in recent decades.
A study of cases referring to “forum shopping” and “foreign plaintiffs” shows a dramatic
spike beginning in the 2000s in cases labeling plaintiffs’ forum choices as “forum shopping” and dismissing them accordingly, often under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Pamela K. Bookman, Forum Shopping Research (unpublished research) (on file
with author).
41 See Pamela K. Bookman, Litigation Isolationism, 67 STAN. L. REV. 1081, 1088–97
(2015); David L. Noll, The New Conflicts Law, 2 STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG. 41, 41 (2014) (arguing these developments seek to limit U.S. interference with foreign regulation); Whytock,
supra note 16, at 532.
42 See Bookman, supra note 41. The trend has continued since I published that article.
See Pamela K. Bookman, Doubling Down on Litigation Isolationism, 110 AJIL UNBOUND 57
(2016).
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Nevertheless, some commentators contend that the United States should
erect even stronger barriers, for example, by strengthening forum non conveniens and modifying choice-of-law frameworks.43
In addition to contradicting their stated goals, these developments can
end up expelling litigation from U.S. courts, including litigation that “has the
United States written all over it.”44 The message of global-forum-shopping
critics and U.S. courts seems to be that foreign plaintiffs should go elsewhere
for their justice. Litigation isolationism thus contributes to an environment
in which forum shopping in other countries’ courts can thrive.45 Perhaps surprisingly to some,46 however, many countries are increasingly hospitable to
litigation. Critics, meanwhile, also malign shopping for a forum in a foreign
country, as shown by recent commentary urging that the United States adopt
stricter standards regarding enforcement of foreign judgments.47 In short,
plaintiffs with choices among U.S. or foreign courts are criticized if they
choose U.S. courts or if they choose foreign ones.48 At times there is little
daylight between anti-litigation and anti-forum-shopping rhetoric.
In other contexts, however, scholars applaud when parties designate a
forum for disputes. Some scholars argue that forum shopping through contractual forum selection clauses is essential to encourage governments to
develop better laws.49 Because the parties’ choices reflect their joint agreement, some scholars contend that through these clauses, individuals and
firms seek out the best regulatory regimes, and that interested states—like
Delaware—may be encouraged to compete for the parties’ presence and bus-

43 See, e.g., Alan O. Sykes, Transnational Forum Shopping as a Trade and Investment Issue,
37 J. LEGAL STUD. 339, 340 (2008) (arguing in favor of “limiting foreign tort plaintiffs to
the law and forum of the jurisdiction in which their harm arose”); Whytock, supra note 16,
at 531–32 n.221 (collecting scholarship).
44 RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2115 (2016) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part, and dissenting from the judgment).
45 See id.; Bookman, supra note 41, at 1115 nn.234–35 (discussing limitations on
empirical evidence and on claims of causation, but citing evidence that this appears to be
true); Bookman, supra note 4.
46 See Pamela K. Bookman, Once and Future U.S. Litigation, in FOREIGN COURT JUDGMENTS AND THE UNITED STATES LEGAL SYSTEM 35, 40 (Paul B. Stephan ed., 2014) (describing the conventional wisdom that once dismissed from U.S. court, cases would go away or
be settled for a pittance).
47 See John B. Bellinger, III & R. Reeves Anderson, Tort Tourism: The Case for a Federal
Law on Foreign Judgment Recognition, 54 VA. J. INT’L L. 501, 544 (2014).
48 Litigants might therefore heed that sage advice: “Do what you feel in your heart to
be right—for you’ll be criticized, anyway. You’ll be ‘damned if you do, and damned if you
don’t.’” DALE CARNEGIE, HOW TO STOP WORRYING AND START LIVING 219 (1984).
49 A robust body of literature supports forum shopping through forum-selection
clauses in contracts. See, e.g., ERIN A. O’HARA & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE LAW MARKET
(2009); Noll, supra note 41, at 69 (noting additional potential benefits of forum selection
clauses).
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iness.50 Interested governments, in turn, will seek to provide those legal
“products.”51
The Article thus focuses on cases outside the contractual context, where
commentators typically assume the benefits of competition do not apply.
Indeed, where forum choices are made unilaterally, scholars argue, some
courts will instead race to accommodate only plaintiffs, resulting in laws and
procedures that are unduly unfair to defendants. This Article shows that
such unilateral choices are made on both sides of the “v,” and neither kind of
unilateral choice is more legitimate than the other.
The Article thus contributes to an emerging literature coming to the
defense of global forum shopping. Existing scholarship makes the important
point that forum shopping is often a neutral practice, pursued by plaintiffs
and defendants alike as an element of zealous advocacy.52 But such analysis
tends to start and end with a discussion of parties’ motives. There has been
little direct engagement with critiques of transnational forum shopping (in
part because they are difficult to pin down), either to respond on their own
terms or to demonstrate the virtues of transnational forum shopping. This
Article provides the first cohesive defense of global forum shopping on functional grounds, emphasizing the complex role of global forum shopping at
the intersection of debates not just about choice of forum, but also about
personal jurisdiction, choice of law, and international comity.53
The Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I defines global forum shopping. Part II identifies the standard critiques of the practice: concerns about
legitimacy, fairness, wastefulness, and efficiency. Acknowledging the validity
of the critiques in some respects, Part II responds to them, drawing on comparisons between domestic and transnational forum shopping.
Having highlighted some of the negative aspects of global forum shopping in the previous Part, Part III identifies and explores three virtues of
global forum shopping: preserving access to justice, protecting regulatory
50 See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225, 227–32 (1985) (praising Delaware’s innovations in corporate law
and casting them as a race to the top). But see, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the
Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435,
1444–45 (1992) (countering Romano and arguing that state competition leads to a race to
the bottom).
51 See O’HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 49; Robert K. Rasmussen & Randall S. Thomas,
Timing Matters: Promoting Forum Shopping by Insolvent Corporations, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1357,
1399 (2000) (arguing that designating a bankruptcy jurisdiction before a company files for
bankruptcy creates positive incentives for parties and bankruptcy courts).
52 See, e.g., Ferrari, supra note 17, at 13–14; Simowitz, supra note 35, at 23–25 (arguing
that forum shopping should be judged based on whether it violates ethical standards); see
also Whytock, supra note 16, at 522–34 (empirically showing that rates of transnational
litigation in U.S. courts are not, in fact, rising, and cautioning against further anti-forumshopping reforms on that basis).
53 William S. Dodge, International Comity in American Law, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2071,
2078 (2015) (defining international comity as “deference to foreign government actors
that is not required by international law but is incorporated in domestic law” (emphasis
omitted)).
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prerogatives, and facilitating procedural innovation and reform. Part III also
presents case studies to show how forum shopping in U.S. and European
national courts exhibits these virtues.
Finally, Part IV suggests ways that U.S. courts and scholars can learn
from this reevaluation of global forum shopping. First, courts and scholars
should abandon subjective analysis of “forum shopping motives” in applying
doctrines like forum non conveniens. The castigation of “forum shopping
motives” is a poor fit for most of the alleged “evils” caused by global forum
shopping. Second, U.S. courts and other domestic courts should recognize
jurisdiction over suits where international law permits it on the basis of territoriality or personality. Third, courts should apply a similar jurisdictional
legitimacy test when deciding whether to recognize and enforce a foreign
judgment.
I. GLOBAL FORUM SHOPPING DEFINED
The term “forum shopping” is familiar from the domestic litigation context, but a precise definition consistent with everyday usage of the term is
elusive. At its broadest, forum shopping can describe the “practice of choosing the most favorable jurisdiction or court in which a claim might be
heard.”54 By this definition, forum shopping embraces, among other things,
the plaintiff’s choice of where to file a lawsuit (if there is more than one
option), both parties’ selection of a particular court or arbitration procedure
by contract, and the defendant’s efforts to thwart initial forum choice
through removal or forum non conveniens.55 It can include “forum hopping,”56 seeking out a second forum after a party has not had success in the
first attempted forum; or duplicative litigation, i.e., filing in multiple fora
simultaneously.57

54 Forum-Shopping, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 726 (9th ed. 2009); see also Friedrich K.
Juenger, Forum Shopping, Domestic and International, 63 TUL. L. REV. 553, 554 (1989).
55 Ferrari, supra note 17, at 21–23. A broad definition of forum shopping could also
include, e.g., defendant settlement shopping, where defendants settle class actions with the
most favorable plaintiffs’ lawyers they can find to represent a national or global class. See,
e.g., Xandra E. Kramer, Securities Collective Action and Private International Law Issues in Dutch
WCAM Settlements: Global Aspirations and Regional Boundaries, 27 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL
BUS. & DEV. L.J. 235, 240 (2014) (discussing global settlements under the Dutch collective
action mechanism known as the WCAM); D. Theodore Rave, When Peace Is Not the Goal of a
Class Action Settlement, 50 GA. L. REV. 475 (2016) (discussing nationwide settlement
proceedings).
56 Thanks to Cymie Payne for this term.
57 Ronald A. Brand, Challenges to Forum Non Conveniens, 45 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL.
1003, 1004 (2013); see, e.g., In re Ski Train Fire in Kaprun Austria on Nov. 11, 2000, 499 F.
Supp. 2d 437, 447–50 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), aff’d sub nom. Geier v. Omniglow Corp., 357 F.
App’x 377 (2d Cir. 2009) (granting forum non conveniens dismissal where foreign plaintiffs were simultaneously pursuing actions in Austrian courts).
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Some scholars urge the adoption of such a broad, value-neutral definition.58 But it does not capture conventional understanding. Many understand choosing the most favorable jurisdiction as a demonstration of plaintiff
opportunism. To these commentators, judges, and litigants, forum shopping
means choosing a forum for somehow illegitimate reasons. To them, forum
shopping “conveys a sense . . . [of] ‘cheating’—unscrupulously manipulating
the choice of forum in order to gain an unfair result (one to which the litigant is not entitled).”59 The forum shopper’s intended goal—gaining an
unfair result—supposedly differentiates forum shopping from other choices
in the course of litigation regarding forum and otherwise.
For example, the Second Circuit, a hotbed of transnational litigation,
uses this “intent-based” definition. That court will not defer to a foreign
plaintiff’s choice of forum if “a plausible likelihood exists that the selection
was made for forum-shopping reasons.”60 Nefarious “forum-shopping reasons”
include “the perception that United States courts award higher damages than
are common in other countries,”61 or “attempts to win a tactical advantage . . . that favor[s] the plaintiff’s case.”62 Forum hopping and duplicative
litigation are also seen as illegitimately strategic forum shopping.63 An example of such practices would be if, after losing suits against Volkswagen in the
United States, plaintiffs then refiled nearly identical suits in Germany, or if
American Volkswagen consumers sought to litigate against Volkswagen in
Germany and the United States at the same time.64
In addition to the broad definition and the motive-based definition,
there is a third, less common one. Some courts and scholars use the term
“forum shopping” to refer to a narrower subset of illegitimately motivated
conduct, defining forum shopping as seeking to use a forum that has little
connection to the dispute.65 This “contacts-based” definition, which presup58 See, e.g., Patrick J. Borchers, Punitive Damages, Forum Shopping, and the Conflict of
Laws, 70 LA. L. REV. 529, 530 (2010); Ferrari, supra note 17, at 22–23; Whytock, supra note
16, at 485 n.13.
59 Bassett, supra note 16, at 342.
60 Iragorri v. United Techs. Corp., 274 F.3d 65, 71 (2d Cir. 2001) (en banc) (emphasis
added); see also, e.g., Vivendi SA v. T-Mobile USA Inc., 586 F.3d 689, 694 (9th Cir. 2009)
(reducing deference to American co-plaintiff for engaging in forum shopping).
61 Iragorri, 274 F.3d at 71.
62 Id. at 72.
63 See Austen L. Parrish, Duplicative Foreign Litigation, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 237
(2010).
64 For more intricate international examples, see Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Forum Shopping, Antisuit Injunctions, Negative Declarations, and Related Tools of International Litigation, 91
AM. J. INT’L L. 314, 315–19 (1997).
65 Holt Cargo Sys. Inc. v. ABC Containerline N.V., 1999 CarswellNat 381 (Can. Fed.
Ct.) (WL) (“If a party seeks out a jurisdiction simply to gain a juridical advantage rather
than by reason of a real and substantial connection of the case to the jurisdiction, that is
ordinarily condemned as ‘forum shopping’. On the other hand, a party whose case has a
real and substantial connection with a forum has a legitimate claim to the advantages that
that forum provides.” (emphasis omitted) (quoting Amchem Prods. Inc. v. B.C. (Workers’
Compensation Bd.), [1993] 1 S.C.R. 897 (Can.))).
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poses the illegitimacy of the chosen forum, occurs due to exorbitant jurisdictional rules that authorize jurisdiction over cases that have weak ties to the
forum. Alien Tort Statute litigation like Filártiga was often condemned as
“forum shopping,” for example, because it involved foreign plaintiffs pursuing remedies in U.S. courts in cases that had little to nothing to do with the
United States.66
The problem with the most popular, motive-based understanding of
forum shopping is that it is tautological. How do you know if a plaintiff chose
where to sue based on forum shopping? Apparently, if the choice was motivated by “forum-shopping reasons.” But these reasons—which include
choosing a U.S. court because it may yield a more favorable result—are often
indistinguishable from otherwise acceptable (even if strategic) reasons for
litigation moves. The third option, defining “forum shopping”—the “bad”
kind of forum choice—by whether the chosen court has a legitimate claim to
jurisdiction, is likewise problematic if the case challenges the definition of
legitimacy. These definitions lead inexorably to the conclusion that forum
shopping is a terrible practice that must be stopped. It leaves little room
even to ask whether the practice has any virtues.
This definitional problem exists to some extent in domestic forum shopping debates, but it appears in stark relief in the transnational litigation context, where litigants are choosing among courts in different countries.
Motives may appear more exaggerated because choices are between more
disparate forums in different countries; the “legitimacy” of the forum is
informed by international law; permitting or not permitting global forum
shopping can have foreign policy implications. And indeed, opponents of
global forum shopping—most vocally, the Chamber of Commerce—paint
transnational forum shopping as having exaggerated versions of all the bad
attributes of domestic forum shopping.67
This Article therefore uses the broad definition of forum shopping, but
it focuses its discussion on the “opportunistic” forum choices most often
characterized as “forum shopping” either because they seem opportunistic or
illegitimate. If this seems imprecise, that is the point: it is difficult to identify
the line between purportedly legitimate “forum choices” and illegitimate
“forum shopping.” Moreover, the perceived legitimacy of forum choices
often depends on speakers’ perceptions about the particular case and subjective analysis of the litigants’ motives.68
66 See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, The Costs of International Human Rights Litigation, 2 CHI. J.
INT’L L. 457 (2001); Hannah L. Buxbaum, Foreign Governments as Plaintiffs in U.S. Courts and
the Case Against “Judicial Imperialism”, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 653 (2016); see also infra
Section II.A.
67 See Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 27, Goodyear Lux. Tires, S.A. v. Brown, 561 U.S. 1058
(2010) (No. 10-76).
68 See, e.g., Chigirinskiy v. Panchenkova, No. 14-CV-4410, 2015 WL 1454646, at *10
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2015) (declining to find “forum-shopping” motives); In re Ski Train Fire
in Kaprun Austria on Nov. 11, 2000, 499 F. Supp. 2d 437, 444–46 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), aff’d sub
nom. Geier v. Omniglow Corp., 357 F. App’x 377 (2d Cir. 2009).
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Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, which involved several domestic and transnational forum choices, illustrates the difference between domestic and transnational forum shopping as well as the definitional problem.69 A
Pennsylvania-manufactured airplane with Ohio-made propellers crashed in
Scotland, killing the passengers.70 The California lawyer hired by the passengers’ Scottish next-of-kin asked the court to appoint his legal assistant, Gaynell Reyno, to administer the deceased passengers’ estates.71 Reyno, a
California resident, filed wrongful death actions in California state court on
the estates’ behalf against the manufacturers, alleging that mechanical
problems with the plane or the propellers caused the crash.72
The case involved a series of strategic forum choices on both sides of the
“v.” The plaintiffs decided to sue in the United States, rather than Scotland
(a transnational forum choice); in California, rather than the defendants’
home states of Ohio or Pennsylvania; and in state rather than federal court
(two domestic forum choices). The defendants removed the case to federal
court and then had the case transferred from the Northern District of California to the Middle District of Pennsylvania.73 The defendants then moved
for forum non conveniens dismissal, arguing that the case had closer ties to
Scotland and should be heard there.74 The motion succeeded, but the plaintiffs never refiled in Scotland.75
Which of these choices qualifies as forum shopping? Under a broad definition, all of them. Under a contacts-based definition, the plaintiffs’ pursuit
of a U.S. forum would not be forum shopping, especially after the case was
transferred to Pennsylvania, because under private international law it is typically considered legitimate to sue a defendant at home. But if forum shopping refers only to illegitimately motivated choices, which of these moves
qualify?76
With each of these moves, the plaintiff and defendants were seeking the
most advantageous forum, as is true of almost any forum decision. Nevertheless, the maligned forum choice in Piper was the plaintiffs’ choice of U.S.
court over Scottish court—not the choice of California over Pennsylvania, or
state over federal court.77 Those latter choices—similarly strategically moti69 454 U.S. 235, 250 (1981).
70 Id. at 235.
71 Id. at 239.
72 Id. at 238–40.
73 Id. at 240.
74 Id. at 241.
75 See Richard D. Freer, Refracting Domestic and Global Choice-of-Forum Doctrine Through
the Lens of a Single Case, 2007 BYU L. REV. 959, 974.
76 It cannot be the difference between domestic and transnational choices. Under
different circumstances, choosing among courts within the United States is criticized in its
own right. See, e.g., AM. TORT REFORM FOUND., JUDICIAL HELLHOLES (2007) [hereinafter
JUDICIAL HELLHOLES], http://www.atra.org/reports/hellholes.
77 See Piper, 454 U.S. at 252 (worrying that an alternative ruling would make “[t]he
American courts, which are already extremely attractive to foreign plaintiffs . . . , even
more attractive” (footnote omitted)).
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vated—are broadly considered to be within the plaintiff’s discretion. Likewise, the defendants’ efforts to remove the case from state to federal court,
from one district court to another, and out of the country are considered
wise parts of a thoughtful litigation strategy.78 This is true even if the defendants’ intention was to defeat the litigation entirely and prevent consideration
of the case on the merits.79
In the domestic context, there is intense negative rhetoric against forum
shopping80 even though “the law generally, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence specifically, and the ethical rules do not prohibit—and, in fact, condone—forum shopping.”81 In the transnational context, both domestic and
international law are likewise structured to give ample opportunity for global
forum shopping. But global forum shopping seems to be even more widely
criticized, especially at the Supreme Court.82 And critics seem, if possible,
even more fervent in their arguments about the illegitimacy of and harm
resulting from global forum shopping.83
In recent years, some scholars have come to global forum shopping’s
defense. For example, Chris Whytock cautions that global forum shopping
does not cause all of the negative results attributed to it.84 Other defenders
focus on the motives behind litigants’ forum choices.85 They respond to critics from the Chamber of Commerce to the Second Circuit who disparage
forum-shopping plaintiffs for choosing a forum “for forum-shopping reasons”86 as opposed to other, more legitimate ones.87 By contrast, defenders
maintain everyone has forum-shopping reasons,88 such as the intention to
extract some benefit from a court’s exercise of jurisdiction.89 Even these
defenders, however, still differentiate between acceptable forum choices and
unacceptable forum shopping by trying to examine the “real reason” for liti78 See Freer, supra note 75, at 971–73.
79 See id.
80 See, e.g., JUDICIAL HELLHOLES, supra note 76.
81 Bassett, supra note 16, at 373.
82 See Keeton v. Hustler, 465 U.S. 770 (1984); infra 146–49.
83 Compare JUDICIAL HELLHOLES, supra note 76, with DRIMMER, supra note 22.
84 See Whytock, supra note 16.
85 See infra notes 198–99 and accompanying text (discussing the Chamber of Commerce’s anti-forum-shopping campaign).
86 Iragorri v. United Techs. Corp., 274 F.3d 65, 71, 75 (2d Cir. 2001) (en banc).
87 See Bassett, supra note 16, at 352–55 (discussing the differences between reasons
considered “legitimate” or “illegitimate”); see also supra note 16 and accompanying text. It
is rarely acknowledged that this is in tension with the principle that “penalizing litigants
with nonfrivolous claims because of their purposes for bringing those claims raises concerns under the First Amendment right to petition.” Jerold S. Solovy et al., Sanctions Under
Rule 11: A Cross-Circuit Comparison, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 727, 740 (2004); see also Carol Rice
Andrews, Motive Restrictions on Court Access: A First Amendment Challenge, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 665
(2000).
88 See, e.g., Bassett, supra note 16, at 352 (“[F]orum shopping is, at its core, merely the
decision that a lawyer makes when more than one lawful forum is available.”).
89 These scholars urge a broad, value-neutral definition of forum shopping. See generally, e.g., Ferrari, supra note 17.
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gants’ choices. Franco Ferrari, for example, who urges a “broad and valueneutral definition” of forum shopping, nevertheless deems forum shopping
to be acceptable or permissible based on “the reasons for a choice of one
forum over another.”90
Despite these academic defenses, courts and some commentators retain
a pejorative perception of global forum shopping.91 This perception, fueled
by anti-global-forum-shopping rhetoric,92 has real-life consequences specific
to global forum shopping. It feeds litigation isolationism in the courts and
other anti-global-forum-shopping measures by Congress and the states.93
The conversation about global forum shopping among many defenders
as well as critics is trapped by the tautological definition that provides its
foundation. Because global forum shopping, by definition, is driven by bad
motives, the conversation assumes that global forum shopping has no
redeeming social value,94 leaving critics to debate how to nip the practice in
the bud. But the definition, and therefore the assumptions that follow it, are
ill-considered. The existing conversations also fail to consider the differences
between domestic and global forum shopping. Some of the analysis in this
Article should provide fodder for defenders of domestic forum shopping as
well. But as the next Part will discuss, differences between global and domestic forum shopping should matter as we identify what global forum shopping’s critics are truly afraid of, and whether those fears are justified.
II. WHO’S AFRAID

OF

GLOBAL FORUM SHOPPING—AND WHY?

This Part unpacks and responds to traditional criticisms of forum shopping, drawing out differences between domestic and global forum shopping.
90 Ferrari, supra note 17, at 1, 24; see also Bassett, supra note 16, at 343 (discussing
domestic context).
91 See supra notes 16–19 and accompanying text.
92 See, e.g., DRIMMER, supra note 22; Foreign Judgment Enforcement, U.S. CHAMBER INST.
FOR LEGAL REFORM, http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/issues/foreign-judgmentenforcement (last visited Sept. 20, 2016).
93 See Bookman, supra note 41, at 1085; see also EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., LITIGATION
AND INEQUALITY: FEDERAL DIVERSITY JURISDICTION IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA 1870–1958
(1992); Bassett, supra note 16.
94 International human rights lawyers historically have contended that the United
States should provide a forum in which to vindicate international human rights for a variety of reasons, but these tend to be arguments in favor of the United States providing a
world court of universal jurisdiction to address these global wrongs. See, e.g., Harold
Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347 (1991); Pierre N. Leval,
Distant Genocides, 38 YALE J. INT’L L. 231, (2013); Beth Stephens, Translating Filártiga: A
Comparative and International Law Analysis of Domestic Remedies for International Human Rights
Violations, 27 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (2002). The potential social values discussed in this Article
focus on the virtues of U.S. courts acting as domestic courts with more limited jurisdiction.
This focus is appropriate because the Supreme Court has substantially stifled the ability of
the ATS to transform U.S. courts into a forum for adjudicating international human rights
violations around the world. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013);
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
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Although forum shopping is widely condemned,95 scholars frequently note
that it is unclear why exactly the practice has its bad rap, and whether the
problem is serious.96
In the domestic debate, Debra Bassett catalogs three main objections to
domestic forum shopping: it can lead to higher damages awards; it can permit suits that would otherwise be time-barred; and it can pressure “innocent”
defendants to settle cases that are brought in plaintiff-friendly fora.97 These
objections appear in the global-forum-shopping debates as well. Critics—
including courts, scholars, and the Chamber of Commerce—fault transnational forum shopping for leading to non-uniform outcomes, including
potentially higher damages awards, and for generating unnecessary litigation
and settlement.98 But critics also fault global forum shopping for creating
more systemic problems: resulting in litigation in courts with no legitimate
claim to jurisdiction; wasting time and resources of U.S. courts and society on
foreign cases; and leading to the development of bad laws through a “race to
the bottom.”99 These are all incommensurable values that are difficult to
weigh against each other. But in drawing out these criticisms of global forum
shopping from the cacophony of disparagement of forum shoppers’ illicit
opportunism, this Part demonstrates that the focus on global forum shoppers’ motives are misplaced.
A.

Legitimacy and Judicial Imperialism

The narrowest, contacts-based definition of global forum shopping
describes a plaintiff’s attempt to take advantage of a court that has no legitimate connection to the suit.100 Entertaining litigation under those circumstances seems unfair to the defendant and seems to infringe on the
sovereignty of nations interested in the case. These are important concerns
that have particular valence in global-forum-shopping contexts and they
should help courts define the scope of their jurisdictions. But they also raise
difficult line-drawing questions that benefit from international debate.
Moreover, these concerns can be expressed and addressed without reference
to plaintiffs’ “forum shopping motives.”
95 See supra notes 16–19 and accompanying text.
96 See Daniel Klerman & Greg Reilly, Forum Selling, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 241 (2016).
97 Bassett, supra note 16, at 340.
98 See supra notes 16–19 and accompanying text.
99 See, e.g., Ferrari, supra note 17, at 8–9 (cataloging expressions of concern). This list
is not intended to be exhaustive, but rather representative of the principal causes of
concern.
100 See, e.g., Holt Cargo Sys. Inc. v. ABC Containerline N.V., 1999 CarswellNat 381 (Can.
Fed. Ct.) (WL), at 3; Linda J. Silberman, Daimler AG v. Bauman: A New Era for Judicial
Jurisdiction in the United States, 16 Y.B. PRIV. INT’L L. 217, 232 & n.76 (2015) (noting that
Daimler, a foreign-cubed case asserting “claims that have little or nothing to do with the
United States,” presented “the paradigmatic example of the global forum shopping
concern”).
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U.S. courts have a history of exercising “exorbitant” jurisdiction, that is,
jurisdiction under local law that is “unfair to the defendant because of a lack
of significant connection between the sovereign and either the parties or the
dispute.”101 Although a variety of U.S. doctrines limit courts to hearing only
those cases in which they have legitimate authority,102 the United States has
also historically recognized a broad reach for federal statutes and permitted
general personal jurisdiction based on a defendant’s doing business in a
state,103 or being “tagged” and served with process.104 Outside the United
States, such exercises of jurisdiction have often been viewed as exorbitant.105
Piper again provides an illustration. There, the plaintiff sued Ohio and
Pennsylvania corporations in California over a plane crash in Scotland.
Some might consider such jurisdiction to be “exorbitant” because of the lack
of a significant connection between the forum (California) and the parties or
the plane crash.106 On the other hand, the California court likely had personal jurisdiction over these defendants under the law at the time because of
the extent of their business contacts with California.107 And by the time the
litigation moved to one defendant’s home state of Pennsylvania, it became
more difficult to claim that the forum was unfair to the defendants.
A second, related criticism of global forum shopping is that cases with
insufficient connections to the forum raise concerns about “judicial imperialism.”108 If litigants can choose unconnected courts, global forum shopping
can lead to international jurisdictional conflicts and offenses to foreign
nations.109 If the choice of an unconnected court includes suing under a
101 Kevin M. Clermont & John R.B. Palmer, Exorbitant Jurisdiction, 58 ME. L. REV. 474,
474 (2006).
102 For example, personal jurisdiction ensures that courts have authority over the persons brought before them that comports with “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice,” Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer,
311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)), and venue rules try to ensure that the plaintiff’s chosen court
has a sufficient connection to the parties or the case, 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (2012); see also Allan
R. Stein, Forum Non Conveniens and the Redundancy of Court-Access Doctrine, 133 U. PA. L. REV.
781, 794 (1985).
103 See Alan M. Trammell, A Tale of Two Jurisdictions, 68 VAND. L. REV. 501, 506 (2015).
104 See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 610–17 (1990) (plurality opinion)
(upholding a California court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over a New Jersey resident
who was served with process while temporarily in the state).
105 See Clermont & Palmer, supra note 101.
106 Id.
107 See Freer, supra note 75, at 962 n.12.
108 See Buxbaum, supra note 66, at 657 (defining judicial imperialism as the idea that
U.S. courts’ engagement “in the global arena . . . interfere[s] with the sovereign authority
of other countries”). In the domestic context, horizontal federalism issues raise parallel
concerns.
109 See, e.g., Republic of Philippines v. Pimentel, 553 U.S. 851, 866 (2008) (“There is a
comity interest in allowing a foreign state to use its own courts for a dispute if it has a right
to do so. The dignity of a foreign state is not enhanced if other nations bypass its courts
without right or good cause.”); see also Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004);
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984). But see, e.g., Book-
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U.S. law that extends extraterritorially, the overreach of the U.S. legislation
could not only offend but also possibly violate international law.110 The
exemplar of this danger is a “foreign-cubed” lawsuit involving foreign plaintiffs, foreign defendants, and foreign conduct.111 Such suits are a small percentage of U.S. dockets, but they arise (or used to) in certain high-profile
contexts, such as transnational human rights cases and global securities
litigation.112
Curbing exorbitant jurisdiction has been one response to these criticisms of global forum shopping in U.S. courts. In recent years, the Supreme
Court has addressed these concerns by narrowing the breadth of personal
jurisdiction.113 The Court has also narrowed the presumptive extraterritorial
reach of federal statutes.114 Both of these changes to longstanding doctrine
occurred through transnational cases that critics and the Court viewed as
case studies of global forum shopping’s dangers, including, for both changes,
cases brought under the Alien Tort Statute.115 And as a result of these
targeted responses to global forum shopping, opportunities for “foreigncubed” cases have been greatly reduced, particularly in combination with
forum non conveniens and international comity considerations.116 Indeed,
these developments will keep out a large swath of transnational litigation,
even cases with “the United States written all over [them].”117
man, supra note 41, at 1083–84 (collecting examples of cases where foreign sovereigns ask
U.S. courts to entertain cases involving their citizens); Kristen E. Eichensehr, Foreign Sovereigns as Friends of the Court, 102 VA. L. REV. 289 (2016).
110 See F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004); EEOC v.
Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991); Brief for the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Defendants-Appellees, Morrison v.
Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010) (No. 08-1191).
111 See Bookman, supra note 41, at 1098 (describing the term); cf. Gilbert v. Gulf Oil
Corp., 153 F.2d 883, 884 (2d Cir. 1946), rev’d, 330 U.S. 501 (1947) (finding, in a New York
court, the Virginia plaintiff, Pennsylvania defendant, and conduct in Virginia were all
foreign).
112 See Hannah L. Buxbaum, Transnational Regulatory Litigation, 46 VA. J. INT’L L. 251
(2006) (counting under 100 foreign-cubed securities suits); Cortelyou C. Kenney, Measuring Transnational Human Rights, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 1053, 1054 (2015) (counting hundreds of transnational human rights cases over thirty-five years); Patricia W. Hatamyar
Moore, The Civil Caseload of the Federal District Courts, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1177 (providing
the much larger denominator of non-foreign-cubed cases).
113 See Cassandra Burke Robertson & Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, A Shifting Equilibrium:
Personal Jurisdiction, Transnational Litigation, and the Problem of Nonparties, 19 LEWIS & CLARK
L. REV. 643, 650–56 (2015).
114 See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010); Bookman, supra note
41.
115 See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co.,
133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
116 See Bookman, supra note 41, at 1103–05 (discussing forum non conveniens and
comity).
117 RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2115 (2016) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part, and dissenting from the judgment); see also Bookman, supra note 41, at 1121–23 (discussing the limits of comity benefits from litigation
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The criticism that global forum shopping imports cases with too little
connection to the forum is therefore increasingly addressed in the United
States by personal jurisdiction and statutory interpretation principles.118 The
Volkswagen litigation demonstrates this result.119 Whereas ten years ago
securities fraud litigation from the scandal might have been brought primarily in U.S. courts, today that litigation proceeds primarily in Germany, where
Volkswagen stock is traded.120 Likewise, consumer litigation in the United
States arises primarily out of sales of Volkswagen cars in the United States.121
Thus, these reforms have succeeded in keeping foreign-cubed cases out of
U.S. courts by refining jurisdictional limits and by developing effective means
of dealing with “improper” plaintiff “forum shopping motives.”122 This success does not mean, however, that the reforms have necessarily established
the “right” extent of transnational litigation in U.S. courts. I have argued
elsewhere that they have gone too far.123
B.

Decisional Harmony

Critics denounce both domestic and transnational forum shopping for
compromising the goal of decisional harmony, under which similar cases
should come out alike regardless of which court decides them.124 While this
is a noble abstract goal, where there is overlapping regulatory jurisdiction—
for example, when certain conduct can be regulated by multiple U.S. states,
or by multiple countries—it is easy and unremarkable to lose decisional harmony. This is not just because of differences in substantive law. Differences
in countries’ legal systems include vastly different procedures, remedies, and
litigation cultures. The decisional-harmony critique is one area where criticisms of domestic forum shopping have bled into criticisms of global forum
shopping in unwarranted ways.
isolationism). See generally Buxbaum, supra note 66 (questioning the judicial imperialism
thesis).
118 Other examples of exorbitant jurisdiction—e.g., jurisdiction based on attachment
of property—remain, but are increasingly rare. See Clermont & Palmer, supra note 101.
The reasoning in Daimler, moreover, further imperils the logic of these bases. See Tanya J.
Monestier, Where Is Home Depot “At Home”?: Daimler v. Bauman and the End of Doing Business
Jurisdiction, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 233 (2014).
119 See Bookman, supra note 4.
120 Only holders of Volkswagen American Depositary Receipts are bringing securities
litigation in U.S. court. See Matussek, supra note 13; see also supra note 14 and accompanying text.
121 See In re Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” Litig., 148 F. Supp. 3d 1367 (J.P.M.L. 2015). But
see Park Jin-hai, Korean VW Customers Pursue Class Action Lawsuit in U.S., KOREA TIMES (Jan.
26, 2016), http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/biz/2016/08/388_196398.html.
122 See infra Part IV.
123 See Bookman, supra note 42; Bookman, supra note 41.
124 See, e.g., Friedrich K. Juenger, Jurisdiction, Choice of Law and the Elusive Goal of Decisional Harmony, in LAW AND REALITY: ESSAYS ON NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURAL
LAW 137 (Mathilde Sumampouw et al. eds., 1992).
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An early concern with regard to domestic forum shopping was that concurrent federal and state authority could lead to different outcomes for similar cases in state and federal courts. The Supreme Court, in Erie125 and its
progeny,126 balked at the idea that forum shopping should lead to non-uniform outcomes. Erie’s response was to end federal general common law and
try to stabilize uncertainty about substantive choice of law.127 But although
Erie’s solution addressed the difference in substantive law applied in state
and federal courthouses across the street from each other,128 it did nothing
to address the incentives for forum shopping based on different procedures in
state and federal court, or incentives for forum shopping between different
U.S. states.129 Opportunities for the latter kinds of forum shopping flourish
under Erie130 and are countenanced by the constitutional structure.131
Indeed, much early domestic forum shopping was driven by differences in
available procedures, not differences in substantive law.132 Some scholars
contend that lack of decisional harmony should be addressed by making
choice-of-law rules uniform, or harmonizing substantive law.133 But even
assuming substantive law or choice-of-law rules could be held constant, parties would still forum shop. Although it is impossible actually to isolate these
factors, especially in the transnational litigation context, domestic forum
shopping between state and federal courts supports this point.134 Removal
125 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
126 See, e.g., Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965) (describing Erie’s “twin aims” of
avoiding forum shopping and the inequitable administration of the laws); Craig Green,
Repressing Erie’s Myth, 96 CAL. L. REV. 595, 615 (2008) (supporting the common understanding of “Erie as a rule that avoids disparities and forum shopping”). But see, e.g., Shady
Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 416 (2010) (“[F]orum shopping[ ] is the inevitable (indeed, one might say the intended) result of a uniform system of
federal procedure.”).
127 See EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION: ERIE,
THE JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY
AMERICA 79 (2000).
128 Guaranty Tr. Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945) (“The nub of the policy that
underlies Erie . . . is that for the same transaction the accident of a suit by a non-resident
litigant in a federal court instead of in a State court a block away should not lead to a
substantially different result.”). Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co. reinforces
this result by having federal courts apply the choice-of-law rules of the forum state in which
they sit. 313 U.S. 487 (1941); see Michael Steven Green, The Twin Aims of Erie, 88 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1865, 1886–87 (2013).
129 Adam N. Steinman, What Is the Erie Doctrine? (And What Does It Mean for the Contemporary Politics of Judicial Federalism?), 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 245, 248 (2008).
130 See, e.g., Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984).
131 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal
Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489 (1954).
132 See PURCELL, supra note 93, at 179.
133 See Andrew T. Guzman, Choice of Law: New Foundations, 90 GEO. L.J. 883 (2002).
134 For a recent example in the news, Roger Ailes removed Gretchen Carlson’s sexual
harassment suit from New Jersey state court to federal court, and then tried to transfer it to
New York federal court. Roger Parloff, Gretchen Carlson Lawsuit: Fox News Wants No News
About Roger Ailes, FORTUNE (July 11, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/07/11/gretchen-carl-
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statutes do not question the defendants’ motives for seeking out a federal
forum.
The U.S. legal system values this kind of forum shopping. Plaintiffs, the
injured parties, get to choose among multiple fora, despite the possibility of
disharmony.135 Courts assume “that plaintiffs are in the best position to
determine what is for them a convenient and appropriate forum in which to
litigate their claims.”136 Federal diversity jurisdiction permits Congress to
authorize forum shopping between state and federal court precisely to
enable out-of-state parties to forum shop away from state courts. Alexander
Hamilton defended this provision by arguing that state courts could not “be
supposed to be impartial and unbias[ ]ed”137 in cases involving local citizens.
There is considerable skepticism about whether this rationale was justified at
the time or remains true today.138 But even some critics of diversity jurisdiction domestically nevertheless recognize the importance of providing a federal forum for cases involving foreigners.139 In short, the U.S. domestic
judicial system encourages (or at least permits) some forms of forum shopping but discourages others.
On a transnational level, the problem of forum shopping, and its attendant lack of decisional harmony, can take on new significance.140 This is not
solely because of differences in substantive law. There is also greater disuniformity among courts of different nations than among American states.
Perhaps, given such variation, commentators trust outlier countries and their
justice systems less than outlier states. Perhaps some litigation is financially
viable in American courts but not in others, so American resident defendants
may be subject to suits in the United States when foreign companies acting
alongside them might not be.141 Alan Sykes, for example, contends that one
problem with global forum shopping is that similarly situated firms may be
subject to suit or not depending on their nationality.142 Debates about venue
in the domestic context, by contrast, tend to assume that the suit can be
brought someplace.143
son-roger-ailes-arbitration/; David Voreacos, Ailes’ Judge Ponders Request to Move Sex-Bias Case
to New York, BLOOMBERG (July 20, 2016), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201607-20/ailes-judge-ponders-request-to-move-sex-bias-case-to-new-york.
135 See, e.g., Juenger, supra note 124, at 146.
136 Espinoza v. Evergreen Helicopters, Inc., 337 P.3d 169, 183 (Or. Ct. App. 2014),
aff’d, 376 P.3d 960 (Or. 2016) (finding this reasonable assumption applies equally to local
and foreign plaintiffs).
137 THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 422 (Alexander Hamilton) (J.R. Pole ed., 2005).
138 See, e.g., Larry Kramer, Diversity Jurisdiction, 1990 BYU L. REV. 97, 119–21.
139 See, e.g., id. at 121–23.
140 See ANDREW BELL, FORUM SHOPPING AND VENUE IN TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION 90
(2003); LOPUCKI, supra note 20, at 200.
141 See Bookman, supra note 41, at 1107–08; Sykes, supra note 43, at 349.
142 See Sykes, supra note 43, at 349.
143 This assumption is sometimes untrue. See, e.g., Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute,
499 U.S. 585 (1991).
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For whatever reason, foreign plaintiffs do not receive the same deference as domestic plaintiffs with respect to their forum choices.144 The
Supreme Court is quite blasé about certain kinds of domestic forum shopping,145 yet it countenances fears about floods of foreign lawsuits.146 As
noted above, in recent years, the Court has strengthened the barriers against
such suits by fortifying the presumption against extraterritorial application of
federal statutes,147 the forum non conveniens doctrine,148 and a restrictive
view of personal jurisdiction.149 There is a judicial crusade against global
forum shopping.
Of these reforms, the presumption against extraterritoriality comes closest to tackling the kind of forum shopping that Erie addressed: the problem
of two different substantive laws applying to conduct in one state.150 But the
Supreme Court’s decision in Morrison v. Australia National Bank151 does not
mean exactly that Volkswagen can now concentrate on abiding by German
securities laws without regard for U.S. securities laws. Morrison did nothing to
curb the reach of U.S. securities laws—only the ability of private plaintiffs to
enforce them.152 Moreover, from a global perspective, Morrison may have
thwarted private plaintiffs’ global forum shopping in the United States, but it
promotes forum shopping elsewhere.153
144 See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981). Not all states follow this rule in
their versions of forum non conveniens. See, e.g., NFL v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 216 Cal.
App. 4th, 902, 929 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013) (holding that California resident plaintiffs receive a
“strong presumption” in favor of their choice of forum; non-resident plaintiffs’ choice of
forum is entitled to “due deference,” though not a “strong presumption”); Espinoza v.
Evergreen Helicopters, Inc., 376 P.3d 960, 987 (Or. 2016) (adopting the Washington
Supreme Court’s position that there is “no principled reason to vary the degree of deference afforded to the plaintiff’s choice of forum based on where the plaintiff . . . resides”);
Myers v. Boeing Co., 794 P.2d 1272, 1280 (Wash. 1990) (expressly rejecting Piper’s foreignplaintiff-lesser-deference standard in favor of a multi-factor balancing test).
145 See, e.g., Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393 (2010);
Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984).
146 See, e.g., Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013); Morrison v. Nat’l
Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010).
147 See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1659; Morrison, 561 U.S. at 268–70.
148 See Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422 (2007) (holding
that cases may be dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds before a court establishes
jurisdiction over the case); Piper, 454 U.S. at 235.
149 See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 8730 (2011) (plurality opinion);
Bookman, supra note 41.
150 See, e.g., Guzman, supra note 133.
151 561 U.S. 247.
152 See Anthony J. Colangelo, The Frankenstein’s Monster of Extraterritoriality Law, 110 AJIL
UNBOUND 51 (2016).
153 See, e.g., Wulf A. Kaal & Richard W. Painter, Forum Competition and Choice of Law
Competition in Securities Law After Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 97 MINN. L. REV. 132
(2012); Tanya J. Monestier, Is Canada the New Shangri-La of Global Securities Class Actions?, 32
NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 305 (2012); see also Donald Earl Childress III, Escaping Federal Law in
Transnational Cases: The Brave New World of Transnational Litigation, 93 N.C. L. REV. 995,
1039 (2015) (arguing more generally that closing the doors to federal court will lead plain-
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These consequences raise the question of whether decisional harmony
at the transnational level is even the appropriate goal. It seems instead that
at best it is elusive, and at worst it distracts from other worthier, more realistic
goals.
In the global-forum-shopping context, decisional disharmony is to be
expected. Countries regulate conduct within their territorial borders, but of
course people, conduct, and effects cross borders all the time, as do the
effects of national laws. International law rules of prescriptive jurisdiction,154
which are reflected in U.S. domestic law through concepts like international
comity155 and the presumption against extraterritoriality,156 limit the circumstances under which one country’s laws can apply in territories beyond its
borders. These rules permit jurisdiction when a tort (a) occurs on the country’s territory, (b) is committed by the country’s national, or (c) affects certain interests of the country.157 While the last category raises complicated
questions, the first two are well established and widely agreed upon. Indeed,
they look remarkably like the primary bases for exercising venue under federal law.158 These rules try to provide predictability about regulatory authority, but transnational litigation often arises in situations where there is
regulatory overlap. For example, both Germany and the United States have a
valid claim under international law to regulate Volkswagen’s car sales in the
United States.159 They may impose different standards. It is also possible
that one country may regulate the conduct and the other will not at all.
But adjudicative jurisdiction is not limited by international law.160 To
achieve decisional harmony in transnational litigation, one would not only
need to harmonize these substantive laws. It would also require international
consensus on issues like procedure and jurisdiction. Such consensus would
be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to achieve. National procedural
regimes in particular vary greatly from one another and are deeply embedtiffs to shop for other fora); id. at 1044 (asserting that U.S. jurisdictional limits will only
work to narrow plaintiffs’ choices “if other countries adopt similar rules”).
154 See generally RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES 99 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 2, 2016); Wuerth, supra note 28.
155 See generally Dodge, supra note 53.
156 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1670–78 (2013) (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
157 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 402 (AM. LAW INST. 1987); Bookman, supra note 41, at 1105; Wuerth, supra note 28 (comparing international law norms with Justice Breyer’s concurrence in Kiobel).
158 See 28 USC § 1391 (2012).
159 Likewise, a recent Supreme Court case involved allegations of a money laundering
conspiracy in Russia and Colombia perpetrated by U.S. companies and harming European
interests. RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016). All of those countries have the authority under international law to regulate that conduct, but only some of
them do.
160 RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 99
(AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 2, 2016).
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ded in legal and social culture.161 International consensus, particularly in
areas of procedure, is therefore difficult to produce.162 Efforts in the late
1990s to draft a model set of transnational rules of civil procedure163 were
met with much skepticism, and have not been adopted by any country to
date.164 Efforts to synchronize jurisdiction and enforcement of foreign judgments through treaties have also foundered,165 although these processes are
ongoing.166
Moreover, even “uniform laws are not uniform.”167 Where deep divisions exist, harmonization often instantiates flexible rules to accommodate
conflicting viewpoints, which leads to continued diversity of results.168 And
differences—and forum shopping—often persist notwithstanding the adoption of uniform substantive rules.169
This lack of uniformity, which contributes to the lack of decisional harmony attributed to the “evils” of global forum shopping, is not necessarily a
bad thing. As many others have studied, it reflects the importance of

161 Kevin M. Clermont, Why Comparative Civil Procedure?, Foreword to KUO-CHANG
HUANG, INTRODUCING DISCOVERY INTO CIVIL LAW, at xii (2003) (“[P]rocedure is surprisingly
culture-bound, reflecting the fundamental values, sensibilities, and beliefs of the society.”);
Geoffrey P. Miller, The Legal-Economic Analysis of Comparative Civil Procedure, 45 AM. J. COMP.
L. 905, 905 (1997) (discussing the costs and benefits of harmonization).
162 See George A. Bermann, The Use of Anti-Suit Injunctions in International Litigation, 28
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 589 (1990).
163 ALI/UNIDROIT Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure, 9 UNIF. L. REV. 758 (2004);
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & Michele Taruffo, Transnational Rules of Civil Procedure Rules and
Commentary, 30 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 493, 493–94 (1997).
164 See Gerhard Walter & Samuel P. Baumgartner, Utility and Feasibility of Transnational
Rules of Civil Procedure: Some German and Swiss Reactions to the Hazard-Taruffo Project, 33 TEX.
INT’L L.J. 463, 467–68 (1998) (reporting on German and Swiss proceduralists’ skepticism
of the Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure). This contrasts with international uniformity initiatives in other areas, such as the Vienna Convention on the International Sale
of Goods (CISG). See Paul B. Stephan, The Futility of Unification and Harmonization in International Commercial Law, 39 VA. J. INT’L L. 743, 745 (1999).
165 See, e.g., Patrick J. Borchers, One Step Forward and Two Back: Missed Opportunities in
Refining the United States Minimum Contacts Test and the European Union Brussels I Regulation,
31 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 4 (2014); Ronald A. Brand, Jurisdictional Developments and the
New Hague Judgments Project, in A COMMITMENT TO PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW—ESSAYS IN
HONOUR OF HANS VAN LOON 89 (2013); Arthur T. von Mehren, Drafting a Convention on
International Jurisdiction and the Effects of Foreign Judgments Acceptable World-Wide: Can the
Hague Conference Project Succeed?, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 191, 195–96 (2001) (explaining the
impasse in negotiations for a judgments convention on jurisdiction and foreign
judgments).
166 See, e.g., Silberman, supra note 100, at 227–28 (discussing Hague developments).
167 Stephen B. Burbank, A Tea Party at The Hague?, 18 SW. J. INT’L L. 629, 644 (2012);
see Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 VA. L. REV. 1567 (2008).
168 See Stephan, supra note 164.
169 Ferrari, supra note 17, at 10–13.
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national sovereignty and the benefits of global pluralism.170 More importantly for our purposes, it exists independently of forum shopping and would
continue irrespective of litigants pursuing “forum shopping motives.” The
cure—if lack of harmony is a disease—is harmonization, not targeting global
forum shopping itself.
C.

Waste

A third common critique of global forum shopping is that it promotes
wasteful and inefficient litigation that harms courts and litigants. This argument, too, is familiar from domestic forum shopping debates. Both kinds of
forum shopping can drive courts and litigants to spend time and resources
determining the most strategic forum and litigating over that forum
choice.171 It can lead to expensive and cumbersome litigation in a forum not
ideally suited to hear the case, which inconveniences courts and parties
alike.172 Forum shopping can drag out litigation, either to avoid liability or
to compel settlement173—a drain on the entire judicial system.174 Finally,
simultaneous or seriatim proceedings in multiple courts duplicate effort and
further prolong litigation—creating waste from the point of view of both the
courts and the parties.175 In the global-forum-shopping context, these arguments gain strength in combination with claims about legitimacy—the
United States shouldn’t waste its time and resources, the argument goes, on
foreign litigants and foreign cases.
Although widely vented, the wastefulness concerns have at least three
limitations. First, as an effort to protect U.S. courts from transnational cases
over which they otherwise have jurisdiction, the argument rings hollow.
Marin Levy has demonstrated convincingly that courts’ use of the domestic
170 See generally, e.g., Ralf Michaels, Global Legal Pluralism, 5 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 243
(2009) (describing how disciplines such as conflict of laws have come to adopt the ideas of
legal pluralism).
171 See, e.g., Ori Aronson, Forum by Coin Flip: A Random Allocation Model for Jurisdictional
Overlap, 45 SETON HALL L. REV. 63, 74 (2015) (“[N]ormally investing resources in this kind
of strategic planning—gathering information on beneficial forums followed by strategic
forum shopping—is socially wasteful.”); Michael H. Gottesman, Draining the Dismal Swamp:
The Case for Federal Choice of Law Statutes, 80 GEO. L.J. 1, 12 (1991) (discussing the wastefulness of choice-of-law inquiries).
172 See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 249 (1981) (discussing the convenience of both parties). But cf. Bookman, supra note 41, at 1106 & n.161 (questioning the
sincerity of questions of plaintiff convenience).
173 Conversely, reverse forum shopping by defendants can prolong litigation, see, e.g.,
Piper, 454 U.S. at 238, although some argue it improves the justice of outcomes, see Kevin
M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Exorcising the Evil of Forum-Shopping, 80 CORNELL L.
REV. 1507 (1995).
174 See infra notes 189–90 and accompanying text (discussing the Italian torpedo).
175 See Austen L. Parrish, Duplicative Foreign Litigation, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 237,
244–47 (2010).
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“floodgates” argument can be an illegitimate self-protectionist measure.176
When forum non conveniens and other transnational litigation avoidance
doctrines are deployed to avoid a feared flood of foreign-initiated litigation,
those efforts may be illegitimate for similar reasons.177 Forum non conveniens dismissal differs from a transfer of venue between federal district
courts in that “forum non conveniens results in . . . a full exit from the federal court system, whereas a § 1404(a) transfer quite literally changes only
the venue.”178 Courts should thus be more wary of dismissing cases under
forum non conveniens. Indeed, the Supreme Court held in 1955 that district
courts have broader discretion under § 1404(a) than under forum non conveniens.179 But that was before the Court’s announcement that foreign plaintiffs’ forum choices receive less deference than those of domestic
plaintiffs,180 and before the Court seemed to equate § 1404(a) and forum
non conveniens in Atlantic Marine.181
Second, today, a non-merits dismissal on grounds like forum non conveniens may make a case go away, which is perhaps a net gain for the U.S.
judicial system in the form of one fewer case for U.S. courts to consider. But
the case may also return in the form of a suit to enforce a foreign judgment
or as a follow-on proceeding if the foreign litigation goes awry.182
From the plaintiff’s perspective, sending the case abroad is typically
more expensive, and sometimes prohibitively so. From the defendant’s point
of view, non-merits dismissals were long thought to be a boon—a great way to
end litigation. And indeed, this is why defendants drive most forum litigation.
But that perception is slowly changing, as defendants unexpectedly face litigation abroad after forum non conveniens dismissals and thereby suffer
176 Marin K. Levy, Judging the Flood of Litigation, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1007, 1007 (2013)
(making this argument). Courts may have more leeway to restrict their own jurisdiction
for fear of “opening the floodgates” when they are concerned with the proper interpretation of Congress’s intent, see Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255–65
(2010) (discussing congressional intent), or intrusions on the sovereignty of other nations,
see, e.g., In re Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 545 F. Supp. 1130, 1135 (S.D. Ohio 1982).
177 Bookman, supra note 41 (defining avoidance doctrines).
178 Robin Effron, Atlantic Marine and the Future of Forum Non Conveniens, 66 HASTINGS
L.J. 693, 707 (2015); see also Bookman, supra note 41, at 1115–16 (noting that the rate of
cases being refiled abroad after forum non conveniens dismissal is likely increasing);
Effron, supra, at 707–08 (“The costs of restarting the action, both real and psychological,
are likely higher than those associated with continuing to litigate an existing case in a
different forum within the same judicial system.”).
179 See Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29, 32 (1955); 15 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL.,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3848 (4th ed.), Westlaw (database updated Apr.
2016).
180 Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 255–56 (1981).
181 Effron, supra note 178, at 694. See generally Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist.
Court for the W. Dist. of Tex., 134 S. Ct. 568 (2013).
182 See Bookman, supra note 46; J. Stanton Hill, Note, Towards Global Convenience, Fairness, and Judicial Economy: An Argument in Support of Conditional Forum Non Conveniens Dismissals Before Determining Jurisdiction in United States Federal District Courts, 41 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 1177, 1187 (2008).
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“forum shoppers’ remorse.”183 We are once again reminded of the admonition that we may be “damned if [we] do, and damned if [we] don’t”184—it is
possible that if the case is refiled abroad, that may lead to more expensive
litigation at least from certain perspectives;185 if it is not, the discretionary
dismissal may cut off a meritorious case. Both outcomes can generate different kinds of waste.
Third, the wasted-energy argument tends to ignore the court-access and
regulatory interests behind the laws that plaintiffs are seeking to vindicate by
pursuing their rights.186 The forum question includes consideration of
whether domestic courts have a sovereign interest in providing a forum.
That consideration is not a legal technicality, nor is this concern exclusively
the province of choice-of-law rules; indeed, a court dismissing a case on
forum non conveniens grounds may never reach the choice-of-law inquiry.
Accordingly, it is inappropriate to deem the time and resources spent on
forum choices and judicial consideration of them to be categorically wasteful.187 European examples have shown that bright-line rules about jurisdiction—like the first-filed rule of lis pendens188—which should be faster and
more efficient to adjudicate, can themselves promote wastefulness. “Italian
torpedo” actions,189 for example, seek to take advantage of the rigidity of
that rule. In such cases, putative patent infringers file declaratory judgment
actions first in Italy, home to one of the slowest court systems in Europe, in
the hopes of prolonging litigation and extending the time to infringe before
judgment issues.190 Because other European courts must decline jurisdiction
in favor of the first-filed court, this strict rule allows Italian torpedo-ists to
“beat” the system.
Another form of forum shopping, filing repetitive suits in multiple
courts, seems to waste the time and resources of courts and defendants. But
even if one assumes the rough equivalence of different domestic court systems, defendants sometimes prefer this approach to a global settlement or
other unifying procedures.191 And the assumption of equivalence is naı̈ve in
183 See Bookman, supra note 41, at 1083; Bookman, supra note 46, at 51.
184 See CARNEGIE, supra note 48, at 219.
185 See Bookman, supra note 46, at 48–49.
186 See David L. Noll, Regulating Arbitration, 105 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (discussing Congress’s reasons for creating private rights of action).
187 See Alexandra D. Lahav, The Roles of Litigation in American Democracy, 65 EMORY L.J.
1657 (2016).
188 See, e.g., Brand, supra note 57, at 1009–10.
189 The “Italian torpedo” is named for advantages accruing from the notoriously slow
speed of the Italian judicial system. See Mario Franzosi, Worldwide Patent Litigation and the
Italian Torpedo, 7 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 382 (1997) (comparing the European lis pendens
(first-filed) rule to a convoy of ships, where the convoy moves at the speed of the slowest
ship, here, Italian courts).
190 The EU has recently introduced more flexibility to address torpedo actions. See
Margaret Moses, Arbitration/Litigation Interface: The European Debate, 35 NW. J. INT’L L. &
BUS. 1, 15–16 (2014).
191 See infra Section IV.B (discussing Volkswagen).
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terms of the fairness and efficiency of procedures, as well as the ability to
effectuate sovereign regulatory interests. The Volkswagen scandal may lead
to much duplicative litigation in different countries, but in its many and
varied forms, it may afford court access to affected consumers in different
countries, effectuate different nations’ regulatory interests, and push judicial
systems to find ways to accommodate the litigation.
Moreover, one’s view of global forum shopping in particular instances
often depends on one’s views of the merits.192 In the Facebook privacy litigation described in the Introduction, the Austrian law-student plaintiff withdrew his Irish complaints and filed suit in Austria after years of only
incremental progress and the appearance that Facebook and other tech companies had captured the Irish authorities.193 Depending on one’s point of
view, this forum hopping may seem either “manipulative” or necessary to putting Facebook users’ European-law privacy rights before a neutral
tribunal.194
D.

Race to the Bottom?: Distinguishing Domestic and Global Forum Shopping

Finally, some scholars worry that domestic forum shopping leads to a
“race to the bottom” wherein some courts compete for litigation by developing excessively plaintiff-friendly procedures. Patent scholars have developed
this argument the most thoroughly, but the argument appears in other
domestic contexts as well.195
Transnational litigation scholars note the development of a transnational law market, in which parties shop among jurisdictions for courts and
192 Juenger, supra note 124, at 143 (“[V]iews on forum shopping vary depending on
whose ox is being gored.”).
193 See PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW TO
LIMIT IT 13 (Daniel Carpenter & David A. Moss eds., 2014). See generally Legal Procedure
Against “Facebook Ireland Limited”, supra note 31 (linking to twenty-two of the complaints
against Facebook).
194 See Anupam Chander, Facebookistan, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1807, 1825–28 (2012) (discussing the domestic and EU law at issue in the Irish and Austrian cases). Similar analysis
applies in many different contexts, from antitrust defendants seeking to take advantage of
foreign clawback statutes to undo treble damages awarded in U.S. courts, to Yahoo! asking
U.S. courts to undo French court injunctions against selling Nazi paraphernalia online. See
Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 1211 (9th
Cir. 2006) (en banc) (opinion of Fletcher, J.).
195 J. Jonas Anderson, Court Competition for Patent Cases, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 631, 645
(2015); Aronson, supra note 171, at 75; Klerman & Reilly, supra note 96, at 243. A frequently cited domestic example is the ability of the Eastern District of Texas, located in a
rural corner of that state, to attract over a quarter of U.S. patent litigation. Klerman &
Reilly, supra note 96, at 243. Because venue may be appropriate for patent cases anywhere
in the United States, enterprising district courts can shift their practices—including procedural rules—to attract plaintiffs. See id.; LastWeekTonight, Patent Trolls, YOUTUBE (Apr. 19,
2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3bxcc3SM_KA. The Supreme Court recently
granted cert. to determine the validity of this rule under the venue statutes. ___ S. Ct. ___,
2016 WL 4944616 (mem.) (Dec. 14, 2016).
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law.196 Within this market, there are two arguments that reflect a fear that
courts may race to the bottom to attract plaintiffs. First, the classic version is
that national courts favor domestic plaintiffs over foreign defendants and
adjust procedures accordingly.197 In more recent articulations of this point,
global-forum-shopping critics—most prominently the Chamber of Commerce—cite high-profile examples of huge, seemingly unfair foreign judgments rendered by courts in favor of domestic plaintiffs and against foreign
defendants as evidence that foreign legal systems are descending into an antidefendant abyss.198 Such arguments highlight tremendous judgments
against Chevron in Ecuador and against Dow and Dole in Nicaragua.199 In
both of those cases, foreign plaintiffs sought to sue U.S. companies in U.S.
court, only to have their cases dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds.
But when the plaintiffs refiled in their home countries, they were accused of
“global forum shopping,” a crime characterized by “trying to hold American
companies hostage in the world’s least accountable and transparent legal systems.”200 The plaintiffs’ home courts awarded tremendous judgments, and,
by some accounts, employed procedures so deferential to the plaintiffs’ allegations that they violated basic due process.201
These examples have taken on an oversized influence in discussions of
global forum shopping202 and have fueled calls for limiting U.S. courts’ ability to enforce foreign judgments.203 There may be a growing trend of litiga196 See, e.g., Donald Earl Childress III, General Jurisdiction and the Transnational Law Market, 66 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 67, 68 (2013); Donald Earl Childress III, Private International
Law and Transnational Litigation, 61 AM. J. COMP. L. 461, 466 (2013) (reviewing INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST LITIGATION: CONFLICT OF LAWS AND COORDINATION (Jürgen Basedow et
al. eds., 2012)).
197 See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Xenophilia or Xenophobia in U.S.
Courts? Before and After 9/11, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 441, 442 (2007); Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Xenophilia in American Courts, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1120,
1121–22 (1996) (describing and rebutting this conventional wisdom); cf. THE FEDERALIST
NO. 80 (Alexander Hamilton) (J.R. Pole ed., 2005) (state courts cannot be trusted not to
favor locals).
198 See, e.g., DRIMMER, supra note 22, at 26; Foreign Judgment Enforcement, supra note 92
(“To prevent abusive forum shopping [such as the $18-billion Ecuadorian judgment
against Chevron], Congress should adopt uniform federal standards governing the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.”).
199 See Foreign Judgment Enforcement, supra note 92.
200 Robert V. Percival, Global Law and the Environment, 86 WASH. L. REV. 579, 613 (2011)
(quoting Editorial, Shakedown in Ecuador, WALL ST. J., Feb. 16, 2011, at A16).
201 In both cases, U.S. courts have condemned the local proceedings. See Chevron
Corp. v. Donziger, 974 F. Supp. 2d 362 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (assessing RICO suit alleging fraud
in obtaining the Ecuadorian judgment); Osorio v. Dole Food Co., 665 F. Supp. 2d, 1307
(S.D. Fla. 2009) (declining to enforce the Nicaraguan judgment for violation of due process). But see Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, 667 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 2012); Chevron Corp. v.
Yaiguaje, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 69 (Can.) (recognizing jurisdiction over Ecuadorian plaintiffs’
suit to recognize and enforce Ecuadorian judgment).
202 See, e.g., Christopher A. Whytock, Some Cautionary Notes on the “Chevronization” of
Transnational Litigation, 1 STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG. 467 (2013).
203 See, e.g., Bellinger & Anderson, supra note 47.
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tions going abroad after being dismissed from U.S. court, or being filed
abroad in the first instance.204 Further empirical evidence is needed to confirm these trends, but growing rates of judgment-enforcement litigation in
the United States support this perception. Outside of flashy outliers, however, evidence does not demonstrate numerous unfair foreign judgments
against U.S. defendants or a need to deny enforcement of foreign
judgments.205
The fear of a “race to the bottom” can also be seen in a second area:
when foreign officials and critics involved in making procedural reforms seek
to avoid replicating what is viewed as an overly plaintiff-friendly American
example.206 As court systems experiment with different approaches to procedure, foreign officials and critics repeatedly cast the American example as
the “bottom” to avoid. U.S. commentators are likewise critical of the American example.207
These arguments ignore at least three differences between the domesticand global-forum-shopping contexts that make the race-to-the-bottom arguments against the former (assuming they are valid) weaker as applied to the
latter: the existence of an overarching constitutional structure; the effect of
competition among courts transnationally; and the limiting power of specific,
rather than universal, jurisdiction.
First, domestic forum shopping occurs under domestic legal oversight
that is, of course, absent in the transnational context. This oversight can
make certain kinds of uniformity goals more realistic, and domestically, uniformity has broader claims to desirability. But in the transnational context,
where uniformity and coordination are more challenging, one way nation
204 See Bookman, supra note 41, at 1110–15.
205 As a separate matter, it would make sense for a number of reasons for Congress to
regulate the standard for enforcing foreign judgments. See, e.g., RECOGNITION AND
ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS: ANALYSIS AND PROPOSED FEDERAL STATUTE (AM. LAW
INST. 2006).
206 This is especially prevalent when countries adopt collective action legislation. See,
e.g., Enterprise Act 2002, c. 40, § 19 (Eng.); Wet van 23 juni 2005 tot wijziging van het
Burgerlijk Wetboek en het Wetboek van Burgerlijke Rechtsvordering teneinde de collectieve afwikkeling van massaschades te vergemakkelijken (Wet collectieve afwikkeling massaschade), Stb. 2005, 340 (Neth.) (Collective Settlement of Mass Damage Act); RESOLVING
MASS DISPUTES: ADR AND SETTLEMENT OF MASS CLAIMS 75–76 (Christopher Hodges &
Astrid Stadler eds., 2013); THE DUTCH ‘CLASS ACTION (FINANCIAL SETTLEMENT) ACT’
(‘WCAM’), RIJKSOVERHEID (2008), https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/binaries/rijksoverheid/
documenten/circulaires/2008/06/24/the-dutch-class-action-financial-settlement-actwcam/wcamenglish.pdf; Antonio Gidi, Class Actions in Brazil—A Model for Civil Law Countries, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 311, 312–13 (2003).
207 E.g., PHILIP K. HOWARD, THE COLLAPSE OF THE COMMON GOOD: HOW AMERICA’S LAWSUIT CULTURE UNDERMINES OUR FREEDOM (2001); WALTER K. OLSON, THE LITIGATION
EXPLOSION: WHAT HAPPENED WHEN AMERICA UNLEASHED THE LAWSUIT (1991); Marc
Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don’t Know (and Think We
Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4, 5 (1983);
Bayless Manning, Hyperlexis: Our National Disease, 71 NW. U. L. REV. 767 (1977).
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states develop law is by interacting with each other.208 The domestic legal
structure limits the extent to which U.S. states can interact with each other in
similar ways to develop certain kinds of norms.209
The Full Faith and Credit Clause, for example, ensures that U.S. states
respect each other’s judgments and apply each other’s substantive laws. Federal court decisions are recognized and enforced nationwide. The international level has no Full Faith and Credit Clause. If the Eastern District of
Texas were a separate country vying for litigation (let’s say, patent litigation210), its judgments might not be recognized and enforced abroad. And
the fact that few corporate assets are located in the Eastern District of Texas
would make the forum unattractive because its judgments might be difficult
to enforce.211 Lynn LoPucki states that “this . . . need for recognition is the
linchpin that holds the international bankruptcy system together” if any one
bankruptcy court overreaches in taking a case.212 This transnational interplay also appears, for example, in other countries’ refusal to enforce the
UK’s permissive libel laws.213
Likewise, the Privileges and Immunities Clause and the Dormant Commerce Clause forbid U.S. states from discriminating against out-of-state parties, and against each other for inappropriate exercises of jurisdiction. Not
so on the international level. Notwithstanding the existence of treaties that
supposedly guarantee equal treatment of foreign and domestic parties, U.S.
courts regularly disadvantage foreign plaintiffs by declining to defer to their
forum choices.214 As for nation-to-nation responses, nations may impose
anti-suit injunctions against each other,215 enact clawback statutes to allow
their citizens to recoup damages perceived as excessive,216 or use other diplomatic means to express dissatisfaction with how another country’s courts are
exercising jurisdiction in transnational cases.217 These kinds of interactions
208 See Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 184 (1996).
209 See Duncan B. Hollis, Unpacking the Compact Clause, 88 TEX. L. REV. 741 (2010).
210 Jeanne C. Fromer, Patentography, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1444 (2010); Klerman & Reilly,
supra note 96.
211 This is not necessarily an argument against a judgment enforcement treaty like The
Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments. See, e.g., Brand,
supra note 165. But it might be an argument against Full Faith and Credit-esque terms in
such a treaty.
212 LOPUCKI, supra note 20, at 205.
213 See, e.g., Lili Levi, The Problem of Trans-National Libel, 60 AM. J. COMP. L. 507 (2012).
214 See Bookman, supra note 41, at 1094–95.
215 See Bermann, supra note 162.
216 See, e.g., Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980, c. ll, § 5 (Eng.); Amerika
gasshuukoku no 1916 nen no han futuo renbai hou ni motoduki uketa rieki no henkan
gimu tou ni kansuru tokubetsu sochi hou [Special Measures Law Concerning the Obligation of Return of the Benefits and the Like Under the United States Antidumping Act of
1916], Law No. 162 of 2004, art. 3, para. 6 (Japan); see also Goss Int’l Corp. v. Tokyo Kikai
Seisakusho, Ltd., 435 F. Supp. 2d 919 (N.D. Iowa 2006) (discussing the Japanese statute).
See Joseph E. Neuhaus, Note, Power to Reverse Foreign Judgments: The British Clawback Statute
Under International Law, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1097 (1981), for a discussion of the U.K. statute.
217 See Bookman, supra note 41, at 1101 & n.128; see also Eichensehr, supra note 109.
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may not be the most “efficient” forms of communication, but they are an
integral part of how nations communicate and develop private international
law.
Indeed, this nation-to-nation, court-on-court interaction molds private
international law—and some domestic procedure.218 This law can and
should address unfairness and inefficiencies that arise in transnational litigation—concerns often blamed on forum shopping. But targeting “forumshopping-motivated” conduct distracts from addressing the identified problematic consequences, and interferes with this important mechanism for
developing the law.
For example, there are multiple ways to respond to concerns over the
use of the Italian torpedo,219 but some are better than others. Italian courts
or legislatures could improve Italian procedures; courts in other countries
could recognize jurisdiction over appropriate cases even if the cases are filed
first in Italian courts;220 or Italian or European authorities could dismiss
cases if the courts determine that the plaintiffs chose to file in Italian courts
for “forum shopping reasons.” The last approach is inferior to the first two.
It is an ad hoc metric bound to be inconsistently applied, but it is also a bandaid that does not address the heart of the problem and is unlikely to heal the
wound.
The second distinction between domestic and global forum shopping
relates to the “market” for courts in the different contexts. A race to the
bottom is arguably likely among national courts because they will favor local
plaintiffs in cases against foreign defendants.221 But such a race among
national courts should be less expected than among courts within a single
country.222 To the extent that nations are competing with each other, they
are more likely to be competing for capital, trade, business, and jobs than for
plaintiffs to bring suits in their courts.223 There are a few nations—like the
218 See Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process After September 11th, 22 BERKELEY
J. INT’L L. 337 (2004).
219 See supra notes 189–90.
220 See Regulation (EU) No. 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments
in civil and commercial matters (recast), 2012 O.J. (L 351) 1.
221 Foreign plaintiffs are an occasional but unusual constituency for domestic courts.
But see David A. Anderson, Transnational Libel, 53 VA. J. INT’L L. 71 (2012) (describing the
phenomenon known as “libel tourism,” where libel plaintiffs forum shop for favorable libel
laws); Juenger, supra note 54, at 564 (“No one who comes to these courts asking for justice
should come in vain. . . . This right to come here is not confined to Englishmen. It extends
to any friendly foreigner.” (alteration in original) (quoting The Atlantic Star [1973] 1 Q.B.
364, 381–82) (Eng.))).
222 Indeed, in practice, foreign transnational forum selling is more muted. See infra
Section III.D.
223 See BELL, supra note 140, at 33 (“Germany has been described as a haven for defendants.”); O’HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 49, at 74; Peter J. Spiro, Contextual Determinism and
Foreign Relations Federalism, 2 CHI. J. INT’L L. 363, 367–68 (2001) (“In the face of globalization, international economic competitiveness is critical to local economic prosperity.”);
Tsilly Dagan, Pay as You Wish: Globalization, Forum Shopping, and Distributive Justice
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UK and the Netherlands—that seem to be innovating in order to become or
maintain their status as litigation hubs.224 But even these efforts have intrinsic limitations, as discussed below.225
The classic race-to-the-bottom argument “posits that states will try to
induce geographically mobile firms to locate within their jurisdictions, in
order to benefit from additional jobs and tax revenues, by offering them
suboptimally lax [regulatory] standards.”226
Translated into the litigation context, this argument would suggest that
nations, and sometimes their courts, would seek to protect likely defendants,
whether foreign or domestic. There are myriad opportunities for firms to
structure their business and arrange their assets to minimize their ability to
be sued, including locating in jurisdictions with favorable procedures or even
immunity from suit or regulation.227 This was the kind of manipulation that
Erie fought by eliminating the “uniform” federal general common law.228
Indeed, most developing countries’ court systems do not offer financially viable or otherwise available or favorable fora for the resolution of disputes—
domestic or transnational.229 These courts operate at the “overly defendant

(June 10, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2457212.
224 See, e.g., MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, PLAN FOR GROWTH: PROMOTING THE UK’S LEGAL SERVICES SECTOR (2011), http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/publications/corporate-re
ports/MoJ/legal-services-action-plan.pdf; Bookman, supra note 41, at 1118; Stefan
Vogenauer, Regulatory Competition Through Choice of Contract Law and Choice of Forum in
Europe: Theory and Evidence, 21 EUR. REV. PRIV. L. 13, 30–32 (2013).
225 See infra subsection III.D.2; see also Peter Bert, Law Made in Germany On Tour:
Madrid, April 21, 2016, PETER BERT’S BLOG ABOUT LITIGATION, ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION
IN GERMANY—ART LAW, CASE LAW, NEWS ETC. (Apr. 1, 2016, 10:34 AM), http://www.disputeresolutiongermany.com/2016/04/law-made-in-germany-on-tour-madrid-april-212016/#sthash.NbeAFmP3.dpuf (“Law Made in Germany is the initiative of the German legal
profession to promote the use of German law and German courts in international commercial transactions.”).
226 Richard L. Revesz, The Race to the Bottom and Federal Environmental Regulation: A
Response to Critics, 82 MINN. L. REV. 535, 538 (1997).
227 See, e.g., Complaint at 3–12, Korea Resolution and Collection Corp. v. Ahae Press,
Inc., (N.Y. Sup. Ct. filed Feb. 6, 2016) (No. 650349/2015), https://iapps.courts.state.ny
.us/fbem/DocumentDisplayServlet?documentId=GY8ukfMGMHoYo02AukNDFg==&sys
tem=prod (alleging that U.S. shell corporations controlled by judgment debtor’s children
held the bulk of debtor’s wealth); see also Dagan, supra note 223; Eric L. Talley, Corporate
Inversions and the Unbundling of Regulatory Competition, 101 VA. L. REV. 1649 (2015).
228 See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74–78 (1938); see also PURCELL, supra
note 93, at 127 (questioning the federal common law’s “ostensibly nonpartisan
‘uniformity’”).
229 A complex system of international investment protection exists in part to protect
foreign investment in the face of such inadequate court systems. See CARLOS CORREA &
NAGESH KUMAR, PROTECTING FOREIGN INVESTMENT: IMPLICATIONS OF A WTO REGIME AND
POLICY OPTIONS 134 (2003).
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friendly” end of the spectrum. Moving away from this “bottom” is a pressing
concern for global justice initiatives.230
A third distinction between domestic and transnational forum shopping
is that courts’ adjudicatory jurisdiction over foreign defendants is generally
limited to specific jurisdiction. In other words, defendants will typically be
sued in foreign courts only when they have availed themselves of the forum
in a way that relates to the cause of the litigation. Although this description
is in U.S. doctrinal terms, the concept is not unique to the United States.231
This specific-jurisdiction limitation provides another safeguard against
courts racing to an overly plaintiff-friendly bottom.232 As a result, any individual case often has a limited and different set of potential available fora as
compared to other similar cases. The choices and considerations facing
plaintiffs wishing to sue Volkswagen over the clean diesel fiasco are different
from those facing plaintiffs wishing to sue Facebook over violation of privacy
rights. This arrangement differs from the choices available to patent plaintiffs, who typically face a broad and consistent assortment of forum choices.
Because of the ubiquity of consumer goods and intellectual property, patent
cases can usually be brought in any district court in the United States. In
other kinds of litigation, the role of specific jurisdiction may be one way in
which forum shopping moves from being a clumping force—pushing as
many cases as possible toward one magnet forum (like the United States)—to
a spreading force.233
230 To be sure, nations may compete along different dimensions; providing a forum for
litigation disputes is not the only such dimension. Substantive law and tax incentives are
among the other ways that countries can compete for capital. See Andrew T. Guzman, Why
LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38
VA. J. INT’L L. 639 (1998).
231 See Bookman, supra note 41, at 1142 (discussing Brussels Regulation).
232 States’ interest in regulating visitors “justifies only specific jurisdiction to regulate
local activities and not transient jurisdiction over unrelated claims.” Lea Brilmayer et al., A
General Look at General Jurisdiction, 66 TEX. L. REV. 721, 754 (1988).
233 Admittedly, this force is more constraining in some contexts than others. Compare
Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985), with J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro,
564 U.S. 873 (2011).
It is noteworthy that universal civil jurisdiction—jurisdiction based on the nature of
the conduct regulated rather than on the nationality of the defendant or the location of
the conduct or its effects—is not gaining traction, although scholars once argued that
litigation under the Alien Tort Statute would cement universal jurisdiction’s legitimacy.
See Donald Francis Donovan & Anthea Roberts, The Emerging Recognition of Universal Civil
Jurisdiction, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 142, 149 (2006); Wuerth, supra note 28, at 621. Pauwelyn
and Salles, for example, have argued that “the more that international courts move away
from specific jurisdiction towards broader bases of jurisdiction, the more forum shopping
will become a genuine problem (similar to overlaps between domestic courts).” Joost
Pauwelyn & Luiz Eduardo Salles, Forum Shopping Before International Tribunals: (Real) Concerns, (Im)Possible Solutions, 42 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 77, 84–85 (2009) (footnote omitted).
Instead, domestic courts appear to be moving towards specific jurisdiction. See Wuerth,
supra note 28, at 618 (noting that “[n]ot a single justice . . . adopted universal civil jurisdiction in Kiobel”); Jim Yardley, Spain Seeks to Curb Law Allowing Judges to Pursue Cases Globally,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 10, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/11/world/europe/span-
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III. GLOBAL FORUM SHOPPING’S UNSUNG VIRTUES
Thus far, this Article has identified and responded to the principal
objections to global forum shopping. In doing so, it has highlighted important differences between domestic and global forum shopping and has
argued against conflating the two. This Part introduces three unappreciated
virtues of global forum shopping that come to light following this analysis—
the importance of forum shopping in protecting access to justice, promoting
regulatory enforcement, and facilitating law reform. This is not to say that
forum shopping cannot weaken decisional harmony and create other concerns, or that it is categorically good. But as is recognized more commonly in
the domestic context, forum shopping and the preservation of plaintiff
choice also serve important countervailing functions. It is not categorically
bad.
A.

Court Access

As Justice Jackson once wrote, “giv[ing] a plaintiff a choice of courts” is
important “so that he may be quite sure of some place in which to pursue his
remedy.”234 Domestically, it is commonplace for venue statutes to limit
plaintiffs’ choice of forum, but they often also give plaintiffs multiple options
for where to sue in cases that cross state borders.235 The absence of such
plaintiff forum choice may mean that no suit will be brought at all, thus prejudicing the claim and compromising the efficacy of the underlying law. This
is particularly true when the only available forum is effectively chosen by the
defendant, such as the defendant’s home.236
Transnationally, the issues quickly become more complicated. If multiple countries permit a certain claim or type of claim to be brought in their
courts—and that’s a big “if”—forum shopping can help ensure that there is
at least one forum to hear such a claim.237 For example, after a series of
ish-legislators-seek-new-limits-on-universal-jurisdiction-law.html?_r=0 (discussing Spain’s
universal criminal jurisdiction law). “‘It’s not just that China is against [universal jurisdiction],’ Professor Spiro said. ‘It is still a little out of step with prevailing international norms
on issues of jurisdiction.’” Id. But cf. Kurt Siehr, Global Jurisdiction of Local Courts and Recognition of Their Judgments Abroad, in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR ULRICH MAGNUS ZUM 70, at 515, 517–18
(Peter Mankowski & Wolfgang Wurmnest eds., 2014) (describing expansive Israeli
jurisdiction).
234 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507 (1947); see also, e.g., Robert M. Cover,
The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideology, and Innovation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV.
639 (1981); Alexandra D. Lahav, Recovering the Social Value of Jurisdictional Redundancy, 82
TUL. L. REV. 2369, 2372 (2008) (“[W]e should consider the ability of multiple centers of
adjudication to encourage socially beneficial institutional conflict and plural conceptions
of the good.”).
235 See Bassett, supra note 16, at 354 & n.61.
236 See, e.g., Klerman & Reilly, supra note 96, at 303–04.
237 But cf. Brian J. Springer, Comment, An Inconvenient Truth: How Forum Non Conveniens Doctrine Allows Defendants to Escape State Court Jurisdiction, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 833, 834
(2015).
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cases brought by plaintiffs from many Latin American countries against Dow
Chemical and Dole Foods over the use of the pesticide DBCP on banana
fields were dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds, the plaintiffs were
sent back to their various home courts.238 Very few refiled their cases.239
This is not to say, however, that these countries did not want the cases to be
litigated. The conflict was not one of substantive law—international law and
the law of the relevant Latin American country would have likely applied
wherever the case was litigated. And several Latin American countries have
enacted statutes to deprive their own courts of jurisdiction and disarm the
effect of a U.S. forum-non-conveniens dismissal because they want their
plaintiffs to be able to sue in U.S. courts.240 On the other hand, some commentators have argued that the availability of other countries’ courts can
thwart needed development of local courts.241
This clash of court availability is different from a situation involving a
clash of substantive law as in Morrison, or a situation where a nation has
decided not to allow private litigation over certain claims, as South Africa did
with respect to claims arising out of apartheid.242 In those cases, the existence of a U.S. forum itself creates a conflict of laws. This court-access point
is a modest but important one: under certain circumstances, plaintiffs’ forum
choices, even if they are strategic or opportunistic, can protect court access in
a way that can be consistent with the laws of the nations involved as well as
international law.
Protecting the plaintiff’s choice of where to sue can also counter the
alternative possibility of defendants choosing where to be sued. The manipulability of businesses and assets can empower defendants to control forum
selection for certain kinds of litigation against them. Such a result will typically either defang or eliminate litigation altogether. This is one potential
explanation of the Austrian Facebook litigation.243 Outside the United
States and Canada, Facebook’s global headquarters is in Ireland, which offers

238 See Henry Saint Dahl, Forum Non Conveniens, Latin America and Blocking Statutes, 35
U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 21 (2003) (discussing the effects of forum non conveniens
doctrine in Latin America).
239 See Jonathan C. Drimmer & Sarah R. Lamoree, Think Globally, Sue Locally: Trends and
Out-of-Court Tactics in Transitional Tort Actions, 29 BERKELEY J. INT’L L., 456, 471 (2011).
Nicaragua was the exception, although the litigation that proceeded there has become the
focus of anti-global-forum-shopping attention. See, e.g., Bookman, supra note 41, at
1082–83; Dahl, supra note 238.
240 See Bookman, supra note 41, at 1101 (discussing these statutes).
241 See Delphine Nougayrède, Outsourcing Law in Post-Soviet Russia, 6 J. EURASIAN L. 383
(2013).
242 See generally Julian Simcock, Note, Unfinished Business: Reconciling the Apartheid Reparation Litigation with South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 47 STAN. J. INT’L L.
239, 242–49 (2011) (discussing the structure and purpose of the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission).
243 See infra subsection III.D.2.
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multinational companies tax advantages and other incentives.244 Thus, it is
perhaps unsurprising that Irish regulators dragged their feet in evaluating
claims that Facebook was violating European privacy laws.245 To have these
claims evaluated, an Austrian plaintiff might reasonably seek out an Austrian
court to vindicate these privacy rights, despite Facebook’s argument that it
would properly be subject to suit only in Ireland or the United States.246
B.

Law Enforcement

A more controversial scenario arises when global forum shopping
enables private plaintiffs to seek to enforce a particular regulatory regime.
While such plaintiffs are castigated for “taking advantage” of favorable local
laws,247 there is an alternative perspective: forum shoppers seek to enforce
and potentially broaden the influence of those laws. This is often not a popular perspective, especially when the forum’s claim to jurisdiction is weak. For
example, Morrison was a foreign-cubed case where foreign plaintiffs sued foreign defendants for securities fraud on a foreign market.248 Several foreign
countries objected to the lawsuit, pointing out, among other things, that recognizing a cause of action in this case effectuated U.S. regulatory law in a way
that abruptly interfered with balanced (non-private-litigation-based) regulatory regimes in other countries.249 But in the recent Supreme Court case of
RJR Nabisco v. European Community, the European Community itself and many
of its Member States sued an American tobacco company for alleged international money-laundering schemes that harmed Europe.250 The United
States exercising jurisdiction in this case, these foreign plaintiffs argued,
244 See, e.g., Jesse Drucker, Google 2.4% Rate Shows How $60 Billion Is Lost to Tax Loopholes, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 21, 2000), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-21/google2-4-rate-shows-how-60-billion-u-s-revenue-lost-to-tax-loopholes.html/ (noting Facebook’s
use of this structure); Jeffrey L. Rubinger & Summer Ayers Lepree, Death of the “Double Irish
Dutch Sandwich”? Not So Fast., TAXES WITHOUT BORDERS (Oct. 23, 2014), http://www.taxeswithoutbordersblog.com/2014/10/death-of-the-double-irish-dutch-sandwich-not-so-fast/.
245 See Legal Procedure Against “Facebook Ireland Limited”, supra note 31 (detailing twentytwo complaints regarding Facebook filed with the Irish Data Protection Commissioner in
August and September 2011 by an Austrian citizen, and alleging lack of cooperation from
Irish authorities regarding those complaints).
246 See David Munkittrick, In the E.U., Where to Bring Suit When the Subject Is Data and the
Defendant Is a U.S. Company? Hint: It’s About More than Just Location, PRIVACY L. BLOG (July
10, 2015), http://privacylaw.proskauer.com/2015/07/articles/european-union/in-the-eu-where-to-bring-suit-when-the-subject-is-data-and-the-defendant-is-a-u-s-company-hint-itsabout-more-than-just-location/.
247 See supra notes 16–22, 62.
248 Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 283 n.11 (2010) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
249 See Brief of the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia as Amicus Curiae in
Support of the Defendants-Appellees, Morrison, 561 U.S. 247 (No. 08-1191); Brief for the
Republic of France as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, Morrison, 561 U.S. 247
(No. 08-1191); Brief of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, Morrison, 561 U.S. 247 (No. 08-1191).
250 RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2098 (2016).
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would not disrupt the international legal order.251 The Court found the foreign sovereigns’ positions in Morrison and RJR contradictory.252 I have
argued that they are distinguishable because, among other things, international law recognizes the United States has jurisdiction in RJR over U.S.
defendants.253
But for purposes of the virtues of global forum shopping, the point is
that the issue is complicated. Allowing forum shopping in RJR could have
furthered Congress’s regulatory purposes in enacting RICO, and it would
have permitted the influence of U.S. laws to extend to U.S. nationals’ conduct abroad without violating international law. This result could have
advanced U.S. interests, without interfering with U.S. foreign policy or international harmony.
Nations and their legislatures create causes of action, establish jurisdiction, incentivize certain kinds of lawsuits,254 and otherwise provide a forum
for the vindication of rights so that private litigants can enforce public prerogatives. In Europe and elsewhere, regulatory enforcement through private
litigation is gaining popularity, which has increased court access and forum
shopping, often within the bounds of international law.255 The Volkswagen
litigation in countries from Canada to South Korea demonstrates this role for
global forum shopping. To be effective in regulating conduct that crosses
borders, private enforcement regimes must countenance at least some forum
shopping.
C.

Driving Experimentation

This Article also suggests a third virtue that other scholars have not discussed. Global forum shopping can promote experimentation and reform in
areas of both substantive and procedural law.256
Forum shopping brings cases to courts and compels courts to interact
with each other, to set jurisdictional standards for themselves based on
domestic and transnational considerations, and to seek out procedures to
accommodate the evolving demands of modern dispute resolution. By
presenting these procedural and jurisdictional challenges to courts, transnational litigation—almost inevitably fueled by forum shopping—requires
courts to address issues in concrete terms and can thereby demonstrate to
legislatures the flaws in existing procedures. Global forum shopping’s ability
to promote this experimentation is an unappreciated benefit of the much251
252
253
254
255

Id. at 2107.
See id. at 2106–08 (discussing foreign sovereigns’ amicus briefs).
See Bookman, supra note 42, at 60.
Margaret H. Lemos, Special Incentives to Sue, 95 MINN. L. REV. 782 (2011).
See R. DANIEL KELEMEN, EUROLEGALISM: THE TRANSFORMATION OF LAW AND REGULATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (2011).
256 This observation need not be limited to national court systems. It may apply as well
to other dispute resolution mechanisms, such as mediation and arbitration, although those
fields are beyond the scope of this Article. See Cover, supra note 234, at 639 (discussing the
“jurisdictional complexities” of having fifty separate state court systems).
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maligned practice. Even though the experiments don’t always “work” at
achieving even their stated goals or consistently lead to “good” results, the
experimentation itself is beneficial as a process of developing law.257
Many studies have evaluated jurisdictional concurrence as a driver of
experimentation with substantive law. The classic and increasingly controversial example is Delaware’s development of corporate law,258 but the argument is explored internationally in substantive law realms as well.259 Forum
shopping can facilitate substantive law development because of its role in
transnational legal processes.260 Indeed, litigants are often shopping for
favorable substantive law, and forum shopping provides a platform for courts
to defend their countries’ policy choices, such as their countries’ view of free
speech or privacy.261 Even when consistent choice-of-law rules would cause
different courts to apply the same law, different forums’ interpretations can
contribute to the development of that single law.262
This Section and the next call attention to global forum shopping’s ability to facilitate procedural legal reform.263 As the U.S. and European examples below show,264 courts respond to litigants’ requests. Whether such
requests relate to accommodating procedures or expanded conceptions of
jurisdiction, litigant requests are not always sufficient to spark useful reform,
257 See Juenger, supra note 54, at 571 (“The reaction of a federal district court judge, for
instance, to members of the bar who had flown to India shortly after the Bhopal disaster
with calling cards in their pockets, is not surprising. But this extreme case of international
ambulance-chasing did at least alert the Indian Government to the need to pursue the
victims’ claims aggressively.” (footnote omitted)).
258 See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225, 227–32 (1985) (praising Delaware’s innovations in corporate law
and casting them as a race to the top); see also Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the
Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435,
1484 (1992) (countering Romano’s argument with contentions that the state competition
leads to a race to the bottom); O’HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 49, at 107–31.
259 See, e.g., Ralf Michaels, Two Paradigms of Jurisdiction, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1003,
1004–05 (debating whether global jurisdiction causes or hinders the convergence of legal
standards); Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Patent Experimentalism, 101 VA. L. REV. 65, 100–02
(2015) (discussing experimentation with patent policies across countries); Scott J. Shackelford, Toward Cyberpeace: Managing Cyberattacks Through Polycentric Governance, 62 AM. U. L.
REV. 1273, 1352 (2013) (arguing that nations should be “laboratories for polycentric governance in cyberspace”).
260 Koh, supra note 208, at 206.
261 See, e.g., Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d
1199, 1211 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (opinion of Fletcher, J.) (per curiam); Case C-131/
12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD), 2014 E.C.R. 317,
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/celex.jsf?celex=62012CJ0131&lang1=en&type=TXT&ancre=.
262 Thanks to Scott Dodson for offering this point.
263 Here, I do not wish to engage in debates about the line between substance and
procedure, but rather to focus on the clearly procedural side of the developments fostered
by forum shopping. See, e.g., Thomas O. Main, The Procedural Foundation of Substantive Law,
87 WASH. U. L. REV. 801 (2010) (discussing the overlap between procedural law and substantive law in the context of forum choice).
264 See infra Section III.D.
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but they are almost always necessary. Whether these plaintiffs are intrepid or
annoying may depend on one’s view of the merits of their cause or of their
underlying “motives,” but their suits present opportunities for courts to
develop responses to the changing demands of litigation. Recent years have
been particularly fertile in the realm of procedural reform, and global forum
shopping has played a significant role. And yet few scholars have drawn
attention to this phenomenon or its importance when they explore and
respond to the common criticisms of global forum shopping.265
Global forum shopping can facilitate procedural experimentation in several ways. It can cross-pollinate courts with lawyers and litigants from other
jurisdictions who bring experiences with other systems and creative applications of those other systems to transplant into the local domestic court system.266 This presses courts to determine whether to accommodate these
different kinds of procedures.
Lawyers and litigants have been bringing legal theories from one nation
to another for centuries. The lawyers in Hadley v. Baxendale,267 for example,
argued French principles of consequential contract damages to the English
courts, which adopted them.268 More recently, Dan Kelemen has documented how U.S. plaintiffs’ lawyers have opened offices abroad, particularly
in Europe, influencing legal culture there.269 Similarly, after Morrison closed
the doors on global securities class actions in the United States, American
lawyers started studying for the Canadian bar.270
When lawyers and litigants are the vehicles for ideas to travel from one
jurisdiction to the next, the process is sometimes understood to be diffusion.271 Classic diffusion theory states that diverse laws “spread quickly
within regions and around the globe” through mechanisms such as mimicry,
competition, and learning.272 These mechanisms all play a role in leading to
changes in domestic procedures throughout the world today.
265 See supra notes 52–53 and accompanying text.
266 See, e.g., KELEMEN, supra note 255 (describing the role of American lawyers in shaping Eurolegalism).
267 (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex.).
268 See Richard Danzig, Hadley v. Baxendale: A Study in the Industrialization of the Law, in
CONTRACTS STORIES 1, 4–6 (Douglas G. Baird ed., 2007).
269 See KELEMEN, supra note 255, at 82.
270 See Bookman, supra note 41, at 1116; Monestier, supra note 153, at 308.
271 See, e.g., RYAN GOODMAN & DEREK JINKS, SOCIALIZING STATES: PROMOTING HUMAN
RIGHTS THROUGH INTERNATIONAL LAW 37 (2013); Mirjan Damas̆ka, The Uncertain Fate of
Evidentiary Transplants: Anglo-American and Continental Experiments, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 839,
839 (1997) (“Inspiration for procedural reform is increasingly sought in the legal thesaurus of foreign countries.”); Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm
Dynamics and Political Change, 52 INT’L ORG. 887, 893–94 (1998).
272 See KATERINA LINOS, THE DEMOCRATIC FOUNDATIONS OF POLICY DIFFUSION: HOW
HEALTH, FAMILY AND EMPLOYMENT LAW SPREAD ACROSS COUNTRIES 1, 86, 139 (2013); see
also, e.g., Frank Dobbin et al., The Global Diffusion of Public Policies: Social Construction, Coercion, Competition, or Learning?, 33 ANN. REV. OF SOC. 449, 450 (2007); Jeffrey L. Dunoff, A
New Approach to Regime Interaction, in REGIME INTERACTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: FACING
FRAGMENTATION 136 (Margaret A. Young ed., 2012) (proposing a holistic approach to
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But diffusion theory273 is not a complete fit to describe the influence of
forum shopping. Innovations promoted by forum shoppers need not take an
idea from one jurisdiction and transplant it to the next. Indeed, sometimes
innovation involves creatively working within a system. In the terms of Richard Marcus’s “modes of procedural reform,” global forum shopping can
drive development of procedure by the judiciary, increase borrowing, and
encourage both bottom-up and top-down reform.274
More fundamentally, forum shopping can involve litigants trying to convince courts to entertain certain claims—based on forum or foreign law—
within the confines of the existing domestic court procedural rubrics.275 In
Filártiga, for example, the litigants advocated using a little-known federal statute to permit a federal court claim under international law.276 In the Austrian Facebook case, the only available mechanism for aggregating claims was
by assignment, so the plaintiff took to the Internet to request that other
Facebook users assign him their claims.277 He is now asking the European
Court of Justice to recognize the largest putative “class action” Europe has
ever seen.278 The U.S. Volkswagen litigation has tested the limits of the
multi-district litigation (MDL) process and its interaction with privately created settlement funds. Outside the United States, claimants are suing Volkswagen under new or little used domestic procedures that may need to adapt
to accommodate the case.279
These efforts involved litigants who pushed the envelope, asserting litigation strategies that were not time-tested, and potentially trying the boundaries of the line between “legitimate” forum choices and “illegitimate” forum
shopping. But these efforts have the potential to make a significant impact on
the development of procedural mechanisms in their respective domestic
court systems.
Forum shopping also leads courts to interact with each other, providing
occasions for them to learn about other legal systems, including choice-of-law
understanding the interaction among regimes); Gregory Shaffer, Transnational Legal Process and State Change, 37 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 229, 236 (2012) (“Transnational norms do not
travel by themselves. They are constructed, conveyed, and carried by actors . . . .”); id. at
259 (“[F]ocusing on the construction and migration of transnational legal norms through
transnational legal processes is critical for the analysis of how national law and institutions
are shaped and understood. It is where the action is.”).
273 See Dobbin et al., supra note 272, at 450; Shaffer, supra note 272, at 236.
274 Richard L. Marcus, Modes of Procedural Reform, 31 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV.
157, 159, 162–63 (2008).
275 Cf. Olga Frishman, Should Courts Fear Transnational Engagement?, 49 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 59, 100–01 (2016) (discussing the use of transnational practices by the U.S.
Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of Israel).
276 Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 879 (2d Cir. 1980); infra notes 286–301 and
accompanying text.
277 See supra notes 33–34 and accompanying text.
278 See supra notes 33–34 and accompanying text.
279 See supra notes 1–9 and accompanying text.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\92-2\NDL202.txt

620

unknown

Seq: 42

notre dame law review

26-JAN-17

11:30

[vol. 92:2

analysis or enforcing foreign judgments.280 Relatedly, litigating these cases
forces courts to develop rules about the interaction among courts, including
rules of private international law regarding jurisdiction, choice of law, and
enforcement of foreign judgments.
Indeed, forum shopping’s influence is perhaps most clear with respect
to conflicts of law. Conflicts arise when parties bring cases that have ties to
multiple fora. In this context, the two component parts of forum shopping—
jurisdictional concurrence and litigant choice—cyclically redefine each
other. That is, parties “shop” to debate principles of jurisdiction, while
courts and lawmakers respond by refining, expanding, or contracting those
principles. The process continues repeatedly, and as the examples discussed
below demonstrate, such developments are not and should not be a ratchet
in any one direction.281
This is not to defend global forum shopping simply because it encourages creative solutions to the problems it creates. Rather, forum shopping
may be necessary without being a necessary evil. In today’s globalized world,
there may not be a single “best” forum, and it may be folly to conceive of
cases in that way.282 Worldwide consolidation of the Volkswagen litigation in
Germany might represent some abstract ideal, for example, but it would
undermine access to justice for far-flung claimants and the ability of other
countries to provide a forum in which to vindicate their laws.
Forum shopping may lead courts to entertain and accommodate litigation within the confines of their own procedures in order to vindicate any
number of sovereign interests of the forum. Litigants may ask courts to
afford a forum for domestic parties as a plaintiff or defendant, or for a tort
that occurred within its territory, or to vindicate a domestic law or regulatory
interest. Whether the court wants to afford such a forum may be a different
story. For example, some judges dismissed fraud cases based on the Madoff
Ponzi scheme on forum non conveniens grounds, but other judges kept similar cases in federal court because of the connections between the fraud and

280 See, e.g., Paul B. Stephan, Courts on Courts: Contracting for Engagement and Indifference
in International Judicial Encounters, 100 VA. L. REV. 17 (2014).
281 Symeon C. Symeonides, The American Revolution and the European Evolution in Choice
of Law: Reciprocal Lessons, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1741 (2008) (arguing that recent developments
in European international conflicts law originated from changes in U.S. conflicts law).
282 Cf. Bassett, supra note 16, at 384–85 (revealing the myth of the best forum in the
domestic context). Likewise, the seemingly “best” forum may be effectively unavailable.
See supra note 234 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., In re Volkswagen “Clean Diesel”
Litig., 148 F. Supp. 3d 1367, 1369 (J.P.M.L. 2015) (discussing states with connections to the
litigation and noting that “no single district possesses a paramount factual connection to
these cases”). For other examples of cases with no clear “best” forum, see Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2002); Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731
F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984); In re Optimal U.S. Litig., 837 F. Supp. 2d 244, 255–56 (S.D.N.Y.
2011) (declining to grant forum non conveniens dismissal and attempting to distinguish
other similar cases).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\92-2\NDL202.txt

2016]

unknown

Seq: 43

26-JAN-17

the unsung virtues of global forum shopping

11:30

621

the United States.283 These cases demonstrate that part of the analysis of
whether plaintiffs are “forum shopping” appears to depend on whether and
to what extent the court countenances the plaintiffs’ assertion of these U.S.
goals.
Jurisdictional concurrence opens up multiple fora in multiple countries
where litigants can assert these needs. As Adam Zimmerman put it, “[T]he
global convergence of class action attorneys, regulatory agencies, state attorneys general, and even criminal prosecutors commencing overlapp[ ]ing
actions create new pressures on what we want and expect from our courts,”
which may drive courts (and legislatures) “to adopt yet another model to
balance the interests of individual and collective justice in mass litigation.”284
It may appear that procedural experimentation and cross-pollination of
ideas would exist without concurrent jurisdiction and global litigant choices.
Indeed, it may be impossible to quantify how much additional force global
forum shopping offers to drive experimentation. But forum shopping is one
of several forces—even if not the only one—that promote a rich, concrete
version of “court-on-court” interactions.285 Its force can be likened to the
requirement that federal courts confront only cases or controversies. It provides a forum in which courts must grapple with balancing court access, convenience, fairness, and sovereignty.
D.

Case Studies

To illustrate the virtues of global forum shopping, the following two subsections describe the dynamics of transnational litigation in the United States
and Europe over the past few decades. In the United States, global forum
shopping contributed to an expansion of court access and other procedural
developments starting in the 1980s, but in recent years, fears of global forum
shopping have contributed to the development of a more restrictive ethos
with respect to transnational litigation. Meanwhile, several European nations
are growing friendlier to litigation generally and transnational litigation in
particular. As they welcome global forum shopping, they provide opportunities for procedural innovation.
1.

Global Forum Shopping in the United States

A signature example of global forum shopping’s effect on procedural
innovation is Filártiga v. Peña-Irala.286 In the late 1970s, a group of interna283 See In re Optimal, 837 F. Supp. 2d at 256 (distinguishing one Madoff-based litigation
from others that were dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds on the basis that its
claims were based on federal laws, although the distinguished cases also included such
claims).
284 Adam Zimmerman, The Convergence of Global Settlements, PRAWFSBLAWG (Feb. 1, 2012,
2:02 PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2012/02/the-convergence-of-glo
bal-settlements.html.
285 See Stephan, supra note 280, at 84–89.
286 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
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tional human rights lawyers unearthed the forgotten Alien Tort Statute287 to
assert federal jurisdiction over a Paraguayan official for torturing a
Paraguayan national in Paraguay in violation of international law.288 In recognizing federal jurisdiction over such a case,289 the Second Circuit laid the
groundwork for decades of transnational human rights litigation. Although
Filártiga has come under harsh criticism,290 and recent Supreme Court decisions have significantly cabined its potential reach,291 the core contribution
of Filártiga—federal question jurisdiction over allegations of foreign torture
in violation of international law—inspired Congress to codify such jurisdiction in 1991.292 The decision opened avenues for international human
rights initiatives,293 and it continues to inspire some jurists to open U.S.
courts to similar claims.294
The 1980s were perhaps the high-water mark for transnational forum
shopping in the United States.295 Confronted by what appeared to be a deluge of foreign forum shoppers,296 U.S. courts for the past three decades have
sought to stem that tide.297 In a recent example, the Supreme Court’s decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum quashed ATS jurisdiction over cases
arising out of alleged foreign conduct.298 To reach this conclusion, the
Court rewrote the question presented to evaluate an issue the parties hadn’t
raised:299 the “extraterritorial” application of the statute it had called jurisdictional (and thus, thought to be immune from “extraterritoriality” analysis)
287 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012).
288 See, e.g., WILLIAM J. ACEVES, THE ANATOMY OF TORTURE: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
FILÁRTIGA V. PEÑA-IRALA 5 (2007); Harold Hongju Koh, Filártiga v. Peña-Irala: Judicial Internalization into Domestic Law of the Customary International Law Norm Against Torture, in INTERNATIONAL LAW STORIES 45, 45 (John E. Noyes et al. eds., 2007).
289 Filártiga, 630 F.2d at 878.
290 See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 66; Curtis A. Bradley et al., Sosa, Customary International
Law, and the Continuing Relevance of Erie, 120 HARV. L. REV. 869 (2007); Sykes, supra note
43, at 372–73.
291 See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 762–63 (2014); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petrol. Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1665 (2013); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 699
(2004).
292 See Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (codified at
28 U.S.C. § 1350).
293 See Wuerth, supra note 28, at 601.
294 See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 1670–78 (Breyer, J.,
concurring in the judgment); see also Leval, supra note 94, at 234 (urging the importance
of ATS jurisdiction).
295 See Bookman, supra note 41, at 1098; Gary B. Born, Reflections on Judicial Jurisdiction
in International Cases, 12 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1 (1987).
296 See Whytock, supra note 16, at 506 (arguing that this apparent deluge of cases was
not as large as it seemed).
297 See Bookman, supra note 41, at 1115; Burbank, supra note 167, at 632; Childress,
supra note 153. In a random sampling of cases, the rhetoric against forum shopping
appears to have spiked in the 2000s.
298 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669.
299 Id. at 1663.
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just nine years earlier.300 Using unconventional extraterritoriality analysis,
the Court restricted foreign plaintiffs’ ability to invoke the ATS in cases that
did not “touch and concern” the United States.301
One cannot help but speculate that this and other efforts to contract
transnational litigants’ access to U.S. courts are partly a response to perceived
excesses in forum shopping in the United States.302 At times, courts specify
that they are targeting global forum shopping.303 In Kiobel, the Court criticized, and declined to adopt, interpretations of the ATS that made “the
United States a uniquely hospitable forum for the enforcement of international norms.”304 In Morrison, the Court acknowledged the legitimacy of
fears that U.S. courts “ha[ve] become the Shangri-La of class-action litigation
for lawyers representing those allegedly cheated in foreign securities markets,” when it curbed the extraterritorial reach of the U.S. securities statute.305 In Piper, the Court worried that without its decision strengthening
forum non conveniens, American courts “would become even more attractive” to foreign plaintiffs and the “flow of litigation into the United States
would increase and further congest already crowded courts.”306
Forum shopping brought these cases to U.S. courts and compelled the
courts to confront the questions of choice of law,307 jurisdiction, and venue.
The resulting doctrinal developments ended up excluding even cases with
300 See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 713 (2004); William S. Dodge, The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality Does Not Apply to Jurisdictional Statutes, OPINIO JURIS (Jan.
28, 2014, 12:00 PM), http://opiniojuris.org/2014/01/28/guest-post-dodge-presumptionextraterritoriality-apply-jurisdictional-statutes/; William S. Dodge, The Presumption Against
Extraterritoriality Still Does Not Apply to Jurisdictional Statutes, OPINIO JURIS (July 1, 2016, 4:57
PM), http://opiniojuris.org/2016/07/01/32658/.
301 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669; see Ralph G. Steinhardt, Kiobel and the Weakening of Precedent: A Long Walk for a Short Drink, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 841, 841 (2013) (“Kiobel is the first
time that the presumption against extraterritoriality has been applied to a purely jurisdictional statute.”); Carlos M. Vázquez, Things We Do with Presumptions: Reflections on Kiobel v.
Royal Dutch Petroleum, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1719, 1723 (2014) (“Neither of the explanations for the presumption against extraterritoriality supports its application to this [jurisdictional] sort of statute.”).
302 See, e.g., Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States as Amicus Curiae
in Support of Petitioners at 27–30, Goodyear Dunlop Tires, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915
(2011) (No. 10-76); Whytock, supra note 16, at 495–97; cf. Maggie Gardner, Parochial Procedure, 69 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017).
303 See, e.g., Simmtech Co. v. Citibank, N.A., No. 13-cv-6768, 2015 WL 542284, at *3–4
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2015); Augstein v. Leslie, No. 11 Civ. 7512, 2012 WL 77880, at *1–2
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 2012); Gilstrap v. Radianz Ltd., 443 F. Supp. 2d 474, 481 (S.D.N.Y. 2006);
Corporacion Tim, S.A. v. Schumacher, 418 F. Supp. 2d 529, 534 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); In re
Rezulin Prods. Liab. Litig., 214 F. Supp. 2d 396, 399–400 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
304 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1668.
305 Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 270 (2010).
306 Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 252 (1981).
307 See Caleb Nelson, State and Federal Models of the Interaction Between Statutes and Unwritten Law, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 657 (2013) (discussing how extraterritoriality is a kind of choice
of law).
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strong U.S. ties.308 Recent developments in civil procedure, especially in
transnational cases, reveal narrowed court access and jurisdictional power.309
For the pendulum to swing in the other direction, as some scholars predict it
will310 (though others lament that it won’t311), there will need to be more
forum shopping.312
2.

Global Forum Shopping in Europe

Likewise, global forum shopping has been instrumental in developing
procedures in European countries. This subsection profiles such reforms,
using collective action mechanisms as a case study of how forum shopping
can facilitate procedural experimentation. Europe is an important focus
because commentators who are concerned about the migration of global
forum shopping typically cite nascent European reforms, especially the development of collective action mechanisms.313 While these developments are
308 RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2115 (2016) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part, and dissenting from the judgment) (noting that the
case, which will likely be dismissed on remand following the Supreme Court’s decision,
had “the United States written all over it”); Bookman, supra note 4.
309 See, e.g., Bookman, supra note 41, at 1092; Henry Paul Monaghan, On Avoiding
Avoidance, Agenda Control, and Related Matters, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 665, 694 (2012); Stephen
N. Subrin & Thomas O. Main, The Fourth Era of American Civil Procedure, 162 U. PA. L. REV.
1839, 1853–55 (2014).
310 See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, The Preservation and Rejuvenation of Aggregate Litigation: A
Systemic Imperative, 64 EMORY L.J. 293, 306 (2014); Linda J. Silberman, The End of Another
Era: Reflections on Daimler and Its Implications for Judicial Jurisdiction in the United States, 19
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 675, 692 (2015); A. Benjamin Spencer, The Restrictive Ethos in Civil
Procedure, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 353 (2010).
311 See, e.g., Andrew M. Siegel, The Court Against the Courts: Hostility to Litigation as an
Organizing Theme in the Rehnquist Court’s Jurisprudence, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1097, 1108 (2006);
Subrin & Main, supra note 309, at 1841.
312 For example, there is an emerging scholarly debate about the impact of the Daimler
decision and its interaction with consent-based jurisdiction over corporations registered to
do business in a given state. See, e.g., Buxbaum, supra note 112, at 314; Monestier, supra
note 118; Allan R. Stein, The Meaning of “Essentially at Home” in Goodyear Dunlop, 63 S.C.
L. REV. 527 (2012). Against the backdrop of those who interpret Daimler to draw a bright
line that general jurisdiction exists only where a corporation is at home, bringing suit
based on a registration theory of general jurisdiction would likely be deemed “blatant
forum shopping,” at least by detractors. But such litigation may be the only way of answering the question. See Ferrari, supra note 17, at 19 & n.99 (discussing blatant forum
shopping).
313 See, e.g., Class Actions Around the Globe, U.S. CHAMBER COM., INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM,
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/issues/class-actions-around-the-globe (last visited
Oct. 10, 2016); see also, e.g., Spencer Weber Waller & Olivia Popal, The Fall and Rise of the
Antitrust Class Action, 39 WORLD COMP. L. & ECON. REV. 29, 41–55 (2016) (discussing the
rise of antitrust class action mechanisms in Europe, Canada, and Mexico); id. at 32 (discussing “the irony of how the rest of the world is seeking out how best to empower plaintiffs to bring appropriate class action proceedings while the U.S. Supreme Court remains
principally concerned with how to restrain or eliminate that very same type of action”).
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not limited to Europe,314 Europe provides an interesting and important case
study.315
The Facebook example described in the Introduction provides an entry
point for the comparison. There, the Austrian plaintiff moved the litigation
over Facebook’s alleged violation of European privacy laws to Austrian courts
after being frustrated with the progress of the case he brought before Irish
authorities.316 The Austrian litigation may be pressuring Austrian courts to
adapt their procedures to accommodate the case, which could become the
largest putative class action in European history.317 Even within existing procedures, the Facebook case presents opportunities for procedural
innovation.
Three more examples are illuminating. First, an interesting counterpoint to U.S. anti-global-forum-shopping doctrines is the European Commission’s (EC) approach to collective damages actions for infringement of
national competition law.318 The EC’s Impact Assessment Report on such
actions identified a problem: in Europe, private litigation follows successful
public antitrust enforcement actions only about twenty-five percent of the
time.319 Moreover, the “uneven litigation landscape” and lack of uniform
competition rules in Europe have led to a concentration of antitrust damages
actions in the UK, the Netherlands, and Germany.320 This is a problem, the
EC argued, not because of excessive litigation rates in these three “magnet”
countries, but because victims of antitrust violations in other Member States
had less access to justice, making it harder for those states to effectuate their
own competition laws.321 Private antitrust litigation was not adequately compensating victims of antitrust conspiracies (without involving governmental
314 See, e.g., Dow Chem. Co. v. Calderon, 422 F.3d 827, 829 (9th Cir. 2005) (describing
procedural reforms in Nicaragua); Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2002)
(describing procedural reforms in Ecuador); In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster
at Bhopal, India, in Dec. 1984, 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1987) (shopping for a forum to
address the Bhopal disaster, which required Indian courts to develop procedures to
address those cases); see also Bookman, supra note 41, at 1117–18 (Canada); id. at 1112
(Latin American countries, Australia, Israel, Indonesia, South Africa, and Taiwan); Gidi,
supra note 206, at 314 (Brazil).
315 See Hannah L. Buxbaum, Class Actions, Conflict and the Global Economy, 21 IND. J. OF
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 585 (2014).
316 See supra notes 31–34 and accompanying text.
317 See supra notes 31–34 and accompanying text.
318 See Waller & Popal, supra note 313, at 12–16; see also Commission Staff Impact Assessment Report: Damages Actions for Breach of the EU Antitrust Rules Accompanying the Proposal for a
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council, COM (2013) 404 final (June 11, 2013)
[hereinafter Impact Assessment Report], http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/
PDF/? uri=CELEX:52013SC0203&qid=1474478600122&from=EN.
319 Impact Assessment Report, supra note 318, at 19. By contrast, in the United States,
private antitrust suits commonly follow antitrust convictions or guilty pleas. See id. at 23
n.58; see also Spencer Weber Waller, The Incoherence of Punishment in Antitrust, 78 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 207, 225 (2003).
320 Impact Assessment Report, supra note 318, at 19.
321 Id. at 19–20.
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antitrust agencies’ scarce resources).322 Moreover, cartels in non-magnet
countries may enjoy an unfair anti-competitive advantage.323 The solution
discussed was to amplify opportunities for litigation in these other states,324
thereby increasing forum shopping in transnational competition cases.325
Second, the German securities class action law exemplifies how courts
respond to transnational litigants’ demands. In 2001, thousands of Deutsche
Telekom shareholders sued the company in U.S. and German courts,326
alleging that the company’s securities filings misleadingly failed to disclose a
planned merger and overstated the company’s real estate portfolio by at least
$2 billion.327 Because Germany had no mechanism for aggregating these
claims, they overwhelmed local courts and languished while Deutsche
Telekom simultaneously defended itself in U.S. litigation.328 After three
years, the Frankfurt courts began to evaluate the claims. They started by
“expediting” ten cases that raised the most important issues,329 but commentators lamented that the German civil law model of a two-party dispute “sim322

See, e.g., UK CIVIL JUSTICE COUNCIL, IMPROVING ACCESS TO JUSTICE THROUGH COLLECACTIONS: DEVELOPING A MORE EFFICIENT AND EFFECTIVE PROCEDURE FOR COLLECTIVE
ACTIONS 17 (2008), https://www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/judicial-institute/files/Improving_Access_
to_Justice_through_Collective_Actions_-_final_report.pdf.
323 Impact Assessment Report, supra note 318, at 20; JUDICIAL HELLHOLES, supra note 76
(identifying legal “hellholes,” or magnets for forum shoppers); cf. supra notes 65–73 and
accompanying text.
324 Impact Assessment Report, supra note 318, at 27.
325 National initiatives, like the UK’s 2015 antitrust law, could maintain the UK’s place
as the preferred forum for such litigation and thereby counteract the EC’s efforts to level
the playing field, but the Brexit vote in 2016 poses challenges for Britain’s status as a magnet forum. See Simon Camilleri et al., How Antitrust Class Actions Will Work in the UK,
LAW360 (Apr. 9, 2015), http://www.law360.com/articles/640749/how-antitrust-class-ac
tions-will-work-in-the-uk; see also Richard Kreindler et al., Impact of Brexit on UK Competition
Litigation and Arbitration, 33 J. INT’L ARB. 521, 521 (2016). One such challenge is that
British judgments will not be automatically enforceable throughout the rest of Europe. Id.
at 527–28.
326 Holders of American Depository Shares sued in U.S. district court; German shareholders sued in Frankfurt. See Michael Halberstam, The American Advantage in Civil Procedure? An Autopsy of the Deutsche Telekom Litigation, 48 CONN. L. REV. 817, 817 (2016). A nonGerman institutional investor filed and then withdrew its claims from the Frankfurt court
after being requested to guarantee court costs. Andreas W. Tilp & Thomas A. Roth, The
German Capital Market Model Proceedings Act as Illustrated by the Example of the Frankfurt
Deutsche Telekom Claims, in MASS TORTS IN EUROPE 131 (Willem H. van Boom & Gerhard
Wagner eds., 2014). Goldman Sachs, the share offering’s global coordinator, was a defendant in some of the German cases. Id. at 133.
327 See Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint at 2, In re Deutsche Telekom
AG Sec. Litig., No. 100CV09475, 2001 WL 36163316 (S.D.N.Y. May 31, 2001); Dietmar
Baetge, Germany, 622 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 125, 127 (2009); Halberstam,
supra note 326, at 834; Bruce Wardhaugh, Bogeymen, Lunatics, and Fanatics: Collective Actions
and the Private Enforcement of European Competition Law, 34 LEGAL STUD. 1 (2014).
328 Halberstam, supra note 326, at 844.
329 Id.
TIVE
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ply could not process such a large number of claims.”330 Responding to this
situation, the German legislature enacted its first collective action mechanism in 2004, specifically for securities claims. This experimental procedure
created a “model proceeding” to adjudicate common issues in multiple
lawsuits.331
The parallel suits in the United States and Germany provide a useful
contrast between the two countries’ procedures. The German litigation, filed
over ten years ago, continues on appeal today, while the U.S. litigation settled
within five years of the complaints’ filing.332 Michael Halberstam, who has
thoroughly analyzed the two litigations, contends that the German statute
failed to provide meaningful private enforcement of German securities laws
in part because German procedure is weak on discovery.333 This shortcoming, Halberstam argues, prevented the German court from learning more
about the alleged fraud and reaching a more just conclusion (notwithstanding relatively similar substantive law standards).334 Other commentators
agree that the German experiment in aggregate securities litigation was “a
flop.”335 Yet the 2004 act further demonstrates how litigants’ needs drive
procedural innovation. It also shows how transnational forum shopping in
multiple jurisdictions can illuminate parallel procedures, albeit in experiments that are far from controlled.
Third, the Dutch collective settlement mechanism, known as the WCAM,
is another experiment aimed at addressing litigant-driven needs.336 The
WCAM was enacted in response to a domestic crisis over an anti-miscarriage
drug that was linked to health problems in the children of mothers who took
the drug. The scandal led to thousands of similar lawsuits, but the Dutch
courts could not accommodate a mass settlement.337 The WCAM allows
plaintiffs and defendants to petition the Amsterdam Court of Appeals to
make a settlement binding on all class members who do not opt out.338
330 Id. at 846.
331 Id. at 847.
332 Id. at 863.
333 See Érica Gorga & Michael Halberstam, Litigation Discovery and Corporate Governance:
The Missing Story About the “Genius of American Corporate Law”, 63 EMORY L.J. 1383, 1484
(2014) (describing limitations on discovery in civil law systems, including Germany).
334 Halberstam, supra note 326, at 868.
335 Gorga & Halberstam, supra note 333, at 1491 (citing Daniela Kuhr, Sammelklagen
Floppen in Deutschland, SÜDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG (Apr. 24, 2012), http://www.sueddeutsche.de/wirtschaft/telekom-prozess-und-seine-folgensammelklagen-floppen-in-deutschland-1.1340101).
336 Wet van 23 juni 2005 tot wijziging van het Burgerlijk Wetboek en het Wetboek van
Burgerlijke Rechtsvordering teneinde de collectieve afwikkeling van massaschades te
vergemakkelijken (Wet collectieve afwikkeling massaschade), Stb. 2005, 340 (Neth.) (Collective Settlement of Mass Damages Act); see Kramer, supra note 55, at 240.
337 See Pamela K. Bookman & David L. Noll, Ad Hoc Procedure, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 34–36) (on file with author) (describing the circumstances
leading up to the WCAM in detail).
338 Deborah R. Hensler, The Future of Mass Litigation: Global Class Actions and Third-Party
Litigation Funding, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 306, 311 (2011).
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Some see the WCAM as proof that the Netherlands “hop[es] to take over”
the U.S. class action business.339 The largest and most significant settlement
under the WCAM occurred in 2007 for securities fraud claims against Shell
Petroleum.340 The WCAM approved a settlement worth more than $350 million between Shell and plaintiffs from more than one hundred countries.341
In a parallel U.S. court proceeding, Shell reached a settlement with U.S.
shareholders.342
The creation of the WCAM was an innovative response to the needs of
both plaintiffs and defendants. For some commentators, the procedure may
have all the beneficial attributes of other inducements to settle.343 For
others, one criticism may be that the procedure benefits plaintiffs’ lawyers
and defendants, but not plaintiffs.344 Whatever the verdict on the current
version of the WCAM, however, it was created as a procedural experiment to
address the modern demands of a particular case,345 and the experimentation continues. The Dutch legislature specified that it was inspired by U.S.
class actions, but that it chose to recognize collective settlements that did not
involve litigation “to avoid the complications that arise fairly often in American damages class actions.”346 Responding in part to the perceived success,
popularity, and necessity of the WCAM procedure, the Dutch government
has proposed adding collective litigation for damages procedures to complement the WCAM.347
In sum, global forum shopping in the United States and Europe has
facilitated procedural reform affecting numerous subject-matter areas. Some
of these developments have opened courts to more litigation; others have
closed off court access. Domestic courts have reevaluated their roles in transnational litigation and have been forced to confront, within their own procedural systems, some of the most perplexing issues facing modern litigation
today. These developments have paved the way for new kinds of litigation
and strong incentives for global forum shopping.
339 See Kramer, supra note 55, at 237 (quoting Anne de Groot, Nederland Hoopt Stokje VS
Over te Nemen als Land van Class-Actions, HET FINANCIEELE DAGBLAD, Nov. 17, 2010, at 13).
340 Settlement Agreement 1–2 (Apr. 11, 2007), http://shellsettlement.com/docs/Exhi
bit%201%20Settlement%20Agreement.pdf.
341 Id. at 1.
342 Id. at 2.
343 See Kramer, supra note 55, at 236 (describing the debate); cf. Owen M. Fiss, Against
Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984).
344 See Hensler, supra note 338, at 319.
345 See Kramer, supra note 55, at 239 (describing domestic litigation that led to the
WCAM).
346 Id. at 240 (quoting THE DUTCH ‘CLASS ACTION (FINANCIAL SETTLEMENT) ACT’
(‘WCAM’), supra note 206).
347 See Xandra Kramer, Dutch Draft Bill on Collective Action for Compensation—A Note on
Extraterritorial Application, CONFLICT OF LAWS.NET (Nov. 20, 2014), http://conflictoflaws
.net/2014/dutch-draft-bill-on-collective-action-for-compensation-a-note-on-extraterritorialapplication/.
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IV. REEVALUATING GLOBAL FORUM SHOPPING
By revealing global forum shopping’s virtues, this Article has painted a
more nuanced picture of the practice—its relationship to domestic forum
shopping, its potential harms, and its potential benefits. Global forum shopping questions overlap with complex inquiries not only about forum choice,
but also about personal jurisdiction, choice of law, and international comity.
This discussion should make courts, scholars, and critics reevaluate their
prejudices against global forum shopping.
This Part discusses three areas of the law where this more nuanced
understanding of global forum shopping can have an impact. Courts should
excise discussion of forum-shopping motives from doctrinal tests like forum
non conveniens; they should recognize the legitimacy of exercising jurisdiction that comports with international law; and they should reciprocate that
recognition of legitimacy when evaluating whether to recognize and enforce
foreign judgments.
This approach attempts to address both the vices and the virtues of
global forum shopping. First, emphasizing legitimacy concerns and international law, rather than forum-shopping motives, responds appropriately to
the legitimacy concerns raised by global-forum-shopping critics without hampering the ability of global forum shopping to promote court access, private
law enforcement, or legal experimentation. Second, this approach recognizes the difficulty of striving for decisional harmony, and it relies on international comity principles to temper the level of decisional disharmony on the
international sphere. Bill Dodge has defined international comity as “deference to foreign government actors that is not required by international law
but is incorporated in domestic law.”348 International law permits (but does
not require) prescriptive jurisdiction over a country’s own nationals and over
conduct in the country’s territory; “[w]ith the exception of sovereign immunity,” it imposes no guidelines for adjudicative jurisdiction,349 although there
are some bases of jurisdiction that other countries find exorbitant, such as
“doing business” jurisdiction or tag jurisdiction.350 When they are not violating international law or exercising exorbitant jurisdiction, courts should presume that their exercise of jurisdiction will comport with international
comity and not risk undue international discord. Third, these principles
could provide more clarity with respect to what kinds of cases courts will
accept, thus reducing wastefulness to some (admittedly unmeasurable)
extent. Fourth, this approach should promote experimentation and protect
against a race to the bottom that would be overly plaintiff-friendly or overly
defendant-friendly.
These recommendations are directed at courts. Courts can, do, and
should play an important role in regulating global forum shopping. Of
348 Dodge, supra note 53, at 2078 (emphasis omitted).
349 RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES § 302 reporters’ note 1 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 2, 2016).
350 Clermont & Palmer, supra note 101, at 481.
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course, judicial responses are not the only ways to do this, or even necessarily
the most effective in the long term. Other commentators have focused on
international or regulatory responses to curb global forum shopping.351
Some of these approaches may be effective in working towards a balanced
amount of global forum shopping, particularly in certain areas of the law,
like bankruptcy, where international consensus has identified a problem with
the lack of uniformity in substantive as well as procedural rules.352
But international coordination can be challenging,353 and domestic legislation can be slow,354 and these days, unpredictable. In the meantime,
courts are often positioned as first (and sometimes last) responders to emerging developments in transnational litigation. This Part therefore focuses on
how courts can incorporate the more nuanced understanding of global
forum shopping developed in this Article.
A.

Eliminating the Focus on “Forum-Shopping Motives”

One key implication of this Article’s approach is that courts should eliminate the doctrinal and rhetorical focus on “improperly motivated” forum
shopping. Preoccupation with litigants’ intent obscures something critical.
The relationship between global forum shopping’s evils and benefits does
not depend on litigants’ forum-choice motivations. Global forum shopping
promotes beneficial legal experimentation regardless of whether it is motivated by “legitimate” considerations. Nor is global forum shopping that generates waste or threatens decisional disharmony always motivated by
“strategic” considerations. Most forum choices are and probably should be
strategic.355 And many forum choices, whatever motivations drive them, will
lead to some decisional disharmony and wastefulness. These may be inexorable byproducts of what Chris Whytock calls the “evolving forum shopping
system.”356 In the domestic-forum-shopping context, courts often tolerate
these byproducts because they are counterbalanced by other interests,
including access to justice and a related vindication of regulatory prerogatives.357 Global forum shopping furthers these latter goals in the transnational context as well.
Courts and scholars should not lightly accuse lawyers and litigants of
employing abusive, bad-faith litigation tactics when they engage in forum
shopping. Forum shopping may overlap with opportunities for abusive litigation, but the idea of bad faith in litigation strategy should be approached
351 Cf. Childress, supra note 153, at 1022 (advocating international regulatory
responses).
352 See, e.g., LOPUCKI, supra note 20.
353 See supra text accompanying notes 155–65 (discussing uniformity).
354 See CAL JILLSON, AMERICAN GOVERNMENT: POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 148 (1999).
355 See Clermont, supra note 36, at 1921 (observing that there are always forum
choices).
356 Whytock, supra note 16.
357 See supra Part II.
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with caution in an adversarial system, lest restrictions thwart zealous advocacy
and global forum shopping’s virtues.358 Global forum shopping’s detractors
attempt to equate the practice with unconscionable tactics.359 But improper
tactics should be combatted with the tools intended to regulate legal ethics,
not with doctrines designed to regulate the kind of transnational litigation
permitted in American courts.360 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, for
example, recognizes that legal arguments are permissible so long as they are
nonfrivolous and not “being presented for any improper purpose, such as to
harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation.”361 Domestically, seeking forum advantages rarely triggers Rule 11 concerns,362 as the practice is considered an element of zealous advocacy.363
That should be true in the global-forum-shopping context as well—in terms
of whether forum shopping can trigger Rule 11 sanctions or other kinds of
effective sanctions, like dismissing a case under forum non conveniens.
To implement this idea, discretionary doctrines such as forum non conveniens must stop disregarding plaintiffs’ forum choices because those
choices reflect egregious forum shopping or forum shopping “for forumshopping reasons.”364 Instead, courts should engage with the problems they
are trying to address: the objective connections among the case, forum, and
parties. Foreign plaintiffs should receive the same “venue privilege”365 that
domestic plaintiffs receive.
To apply this approach to the Volkswagen litigation, one must look to
litigation in the United States and abroad. The Volkswagen MDL panel, for
358 A full exploration of bad faith in litigation is beyond the scope of this Article.
359 See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
360 See supra notes 137–38 (discussing The Federalist No. 80).
361 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b). Sanctions are available only if allegations are “utterly lacking
in support,” and “objectionably frivolous.” Leigh Handelman Smollar, The Importance of
Conducting Thorough Investigations of Confidential Witnesses in Securities Fraud Litigation, 46
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 503, 520–21 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted) (first quoting
O’Brien v. Alexander, 101 F.3d 1479, 1489 (2d Cir. 1996); then quoting In re BankAtlantic
Bancorp, Inc. Sec. Litig., 851 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1308 (S.D. Fla. 2011)). “‘A legal claim is
frivolous if no reasonably competent attorney could conclude that it has any reasonable
chance of success or is a reasonable argument to change existing law. . . .’ Rule 11 is not a
best-practices standard.” Id. at 521 (quoting In re BankAtlantic, 851 F. Supp. 2d at 1308)
(citing Fed R. Civ. P. 11(b)). But cf. Michael P. Stone & Thomas J. Miceli, The Impact of
Frivolous Lawsuits on Deterrence: Do They Have Some Redeeming Value?, 10 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y
301, 337 (2014) (arguing that frivolous lawsuits are not necessarily detrimental to social
welfare).
362 See supra notes 84–100 and accompanying text. Domestically, forum-shopping critics seek out legislative action to restructure the forum-shopping system; they cannot rely on
courts rejecting forum shopping efforts based on plaintiffs’ motives. See, e.g., Bassett, supra
note 16, at 338 n.15 (discussing the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453,
1711–15 (2012)).
363 See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, The American Class Action Fairness Bill and Forum-Shopping
American-Style, 31 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS. 357, 357 (2006).
364 Iragorri v. United Techs. Corp., 274 F.3d 65, 75 (2d Cir. 2001) (en banc).
365 Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 635 (1964).
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example, did not criticize the domestic plaintiffs for forum shopping all over
the United States, but that case primarily involved domestic plaintiffs. If foreign plaintiffs had joined the litigation, the court should have analyzed its
jurisdiction to adjudicate those claims, not whether those plaintiffs were
“forum shopping.” Motives should be assessed in conjunction with an analysis of whether the arguments brought are frivolous, as they are in instances of
Rule 11 sanctions.366 Forum shopping itself should not be considered a
sanctionable offense.367 Likewise, the German courts should not dismiss
U.S. or other foreign plaintiffs from the securities fraud litigation against
Volkswagen as a sanction for forum shopping. Nor should the WCAM—if a
settlement is ever filed—reject certain parties on such a ground.
B.

Exercising Jurisdiction in Domestic Courts

Instead of focusing on curbing global forum shopping and weeding out
opportunistic plaintiffs, gatekeeping principles should incorporate legitimacy
concerns by recognizing jurisdiction when international law would permit it.
Doing so will sometimes permit or even encourage global forum shopping—
but as we have seen, that need not be viewed as inexorably negative. This
approach should inform courts’ decisions about whether to entertain transnational cases.
I have addressed these issues before. In an earlier work, I confronted
the growing phenomenon of litigation isolationism, through which U.S.
courts have been raising doctrinal and other legal barriers that keep out
transnational litigation. To curb this phenomenon, I recommended that
four “transnational litigation avoidance doctrines”—personal jurisdiction,
forum non conveniens, abstention comity,368 and the presumption against
extraterritoriality—should be reoriented around territoriality and personality. That is, U.S. courts should exercise jurisdiction over cases where the con366 See, e.g., Diaz-Barba v. Superior Court, 187 Cal. Rptr. 3d 403, 416 (Cal. Ct. App.
2015) (“A party should not be allowed to assert the unavailability of an alternative forum
[in opposition to a dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds] when the unavailability is
a product of its own purposeful conduct.” (quoting In re Air Crash Over the Mid-Atl. on
June 1, 2009, 792 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1094 (N.D. Cal. 2011))); see also Arnaud Nuyts, The
Enforcement of Jurisdiction Agreements Further to Gasser and the Community Principle of Abuse of
Rights, in FORUM SHOPPING IN THE EUROPEAN JUDICIAL ARENA 55 (Pascal de Vareilles-Sommières ed., 2007) (suggesting bad-faith litigants should be dealt with under the EC abuse
of process principle).
367 But cf. Kimberly Jade Norwood, Shopping for a Venue: The Need for More Limits on
Choice, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 267, 329–30 (1996) (noting that courts generally have not
imposed Rule 11 sanctions in forum-shopping cases but suggesting that sanctions are
appropriate); id. at 326–28 (stating that restrictions on forum shopping “can be enforced
through Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 11’s state counterparts and
the forum’s own ethics rules” (footnotes omitted)).
368 International comity takes several forms. See Dodge, supra note 53. “Abstention
comity” refers to the doctrine of international comity when it is used as a freestanding
doctrine that gives courts the discretion to decline to exercise jurisdiction over a case. See
Bookman, supra note 41, at 1084.
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duct or harm involved occurred on U.S. territory (territoriality) or where
there is a U.S. citizen defendant (personality). Territoriality and personality
are two concepts that “provide presumptively valid, and internationally
uncontested, bases for prescriptive and adjudicatory jurisdiction.”369 International law recognizes both as valid bases for prescriptive jurisdiction.370
Domestically, territoriality and personality are also foundational bases for
exercising venue in federal court.371
The Volkswagen litigation is largely lining up along these lines. Securities litigation is proceeding in Volkswagen’s home forum (Germany), but the
consumer and dealership fraud cases are being brought in countries around
the world where the fraud occurred, provided that the legal systems give
some kind of opening to such private enforcement litigation.372
The recent decision in RJR Nabisco, however, does not follow this prescription. There, the Court applied the presumption against extraterritoriality to hold that the statutory cause of action for a RICO violation does not
cover claims for foreign injuries.373 Recognizing such a cause of action, the
Court argued, would risk international discord, notwithstanding the protestations by the plaintiffs—the European Community and many European
nations—that it would not.374 The Court grounded its international discord
arguments in foreign sovereign amicus briefs filed in “foreign-cubed”
cases.375 But the test for whether exercising jurisdiction would be illegitimate and thus risk causing international discord should be whether such an
exercise would violate international law. In RJR Nabisco, the defendant was a
U.S. national, and nationality-based adjudicative jurisdiction is widely recognized as legitimate. As for prescriptive jurisdiction, the Court held that Congress had overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality, and many of
the RICO predicates alleged to be violated actually regulated domestic conduct, like the use of the U.S. wires to commit fraud.376 Under the theory
articulated here, the Court should have allowed the RJR case to proceed, and
affirmed the Second Circuit.
C.

Recognizing and Enforcing Foreign Judgments

This legitimacy-focused approach should also inform U.S. doctrine on
the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. When a U.S. court
369 Bookman, supra note 41, at 1133.
370 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402
(AM. LAW INST. 1987); Wuerth, supra note 28, at 619.
371 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (2012).
372 See supra Introduction (discussing litigation around the world).
373 RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2100–02 (2016).
374 Id. at 2100.
375 Id. at 2116 (Breyer, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and dissenting from
the judgment).
376 Id. at 2105–06 (majority opinion); see Pamela Karten Bookman, Note, Solving the
Extraterritoriality Problem: Lessons from the Honest Services Statute, 92 VA. L. REV. 749, 752
(2006) (discussing the domestic-conduct basis of the wire fraud statute).
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considers recognizing or enforcing a foreign judgment, whether forum shopping led to the foreign judgment should be irrelevant.
Recent anti-forum-shopping rhetoric has urged strict standards for recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.377 But this approach juxtaposes an unwillingness to hear cases at home with a refusal to recognize
judgments when plaintiffs bring those cases abroad. This disconnect is most
pronounced in cases where the same suit is dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds, proceeds abroad, and then results in a foreign judgment
that is not recognized by U.S. courts.378
Principles of recognition and enforcement must balance many factors,
including fairness to defendants and plaintiffs’ need for court access. A federal statute on foreign judgment recognition and enforcement, like the one
proposed by the American Law Institute,379 should recognize and enforce
foreign judgments arising out of proceedings that meet basic requirements
of fairness. But those requirements should not demand that foreign procedures mirror American ones. Some commentators urge U.S. courts not to
enforce judgments like those against Chevron in Ecuador and against Dow
and Dole in Nicaragua.380 But these outliers are poor examples upon which
to structure doctrinal rules.381 Based on the defendants’ accounts of those
proceedings, they would fail almost any fairness review. The relevant standard should not enforce flagrantly unfair judgments, but should still recognize innovative procedures like the Dutch settlement judgment, or variations
on opt-in or opt-out aggregate litigation mechanisms. Like U.S. court jurisdiction, foreign courts’ jurisdiction should also be judged against the international-law standards of legitimacy.
***
Volkswagen is currently facing litigation around the world over consumer fraud, dealership fraud, government fraud, and securities fraud.
Much of this litigation is necessarily redundant in certain ways. Some of it—
the securities litigation—is mostly concentrated in Germany. Other kinds of
litigation are happening around the world and are likely to continue for
quite some time. This litigation is “wasteful” in the sense that global forum
shopping is often accused of promoting waste. It is far from harmonious—
different standards apply to essentially the same fraud in different coun377 See, e.g., Bellinger & Anderson, supra note 47, at 502; see also supra note 47 and
accompanying text (describing forum-shopping critics’ shift to focus on foreign judgment
enforcement).
378 See Christopher A. Whytock & Cassandra Burke Robertson, Forum Non Conveniens
and the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1444, 1450 (2011).
379 Linda Silberman, Transnational Litigation: Is There a “Field”? A Tribute to Hal Maier, 39
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1427, 1434 (2006) (describing the draft ALI statute).
380 See Bellinger & Anderson, supra note 47, at 544; supra notes 196–99 and accompanying text.
381 Cf. Bookman & Noll, supra note 337 (describing the pitfalls of designing laws based
on specific cases).
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tries.382 But the courts are acting within international-law bounds on the
legitimate exercise of jurisdiction either over local defendants (in Germany)
or over fraud that occurred within their borders (like consumer fraud actions
in different countries brought by local plaintiffs). These suits may push innovation in these countries to address the complex nature of these litigations.
While the court recently approved Volkswagen’s settlement with government
officials and the Plaintiffs’ Steering Committee in the main MDL, Volkswagen will likely continue to face much more litigation—and continued
efforts at global forum shopping—in the future.
CONCLUSION
Forum shopping has a long history as a maligned practice. Reflecting
domestic forum shopping debates, global forum shopping has likewise
obtained a negative reputation, contributing to U.S. doctrinal barriers to stop
foreign plaintiffs from “taking advantage” of favorable U.S. substantive law
and procedure. This Article has shown that this critical view of global forum
shopping is overblown and that the virtues of global forum shopping—with
its important role in the development of domestic law, particularly procedure—have been overlooked. Appreciating global forum shopping in this
context recommends that the campaign to strengthen the barricades should
cease and be scaled back, and that a focus on jurisdictional legitimacy under
international law should replace over-emphasis on transnational plaintiffs’
allegedly illicit motives for forum shopping.

382

See Historic Settlement with VW Provides Roadmap for European Resolution, GLOBE NEW(June 30, 2016), https://globenewswire.com/news-release/2016/06/30/852486/0/
en/Historic-Settlement-with-VW-Provides-Roadmap-for-European-Resolution.html.
SWIRE
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